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INTRODUCTION
Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs) create technology
standards in order to ensure product or service quality, promote compatibility and interoperability of networked products,
and facilitate the competitive development of new technologies.1 Standard-setting in patent-rich environments often requires participants to disclose relevant patents that they own
and license patents essential to the standard to all participants
on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms. A
statement issued in December 2019 by three federal agencies
acknowledges the value of FRAND commitments and described
them as occurring:
† James B. Dinan University Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law
School and The Wharton School. Thanks to Doug Melamed, Steven Salop, Greg
Sidak, and Erik Hovenkamp for comments.
1
On the role of the antitrust laws in standard setting, see 2 HERBERT
HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, § 35 (3d ed. 2015 & 2020 Supp.) [hereinafter
HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST]; 13 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 2230–35 (4th ed. 2019).

1683

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3420925

R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-6\CRN603.txt

1684

unknown

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

Seq: 2

3-NOV-20

7:42

[Vol. 105:1683

where a patent holder has voluntarily agreed to make available a license for the patent on reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms or fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms while participating in standards-setting activities at a standards-developing organization (SDO).2

As the statement indicates, the essence of FRAND is that it is
the product of a voluntary agreement among the participants,
requiring them to make their patents available on FRAND
terms.
Antitrust best achieves its purpose when it takes markets
as it finds them, and then protects them from threats to competition. The antitrust tribunal must understand the market
before it and the rationales and effects of its various rules.
Then it considers whether a challenged restraint might operate
anticompetitively so as to cause unnecessary consumer harm.
For more than a century, antitrust jurisprudence has approached markets in this way. For example, Justice Brandeis’s
opinion in the Board of Trade case3 began by describing the
Board’s operation as a market. From that point the Court’s job
was to ascertain whether the challenged rule operated anticompetitively to undermine this purpose.4 In the NCAA case
nearly seventy years later it did the same thing—acknowledging the valuable market created by this joint venture of colleges
to promote amateur intercollegiate athletics. It condemned a
restraint on competition that reduced output and harmed consumers and was not central to the NCAA’s purpose.5 The list of
cases in which the Supreme Court has followed this template
so as to protect the competitive integrity of standard setting or
other collaborative market processes is long.6
2
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS TECH. &
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POLICY STATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS
SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY F/RAND COMMITMENTS 1 n.2 (2019), https://www.
uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/SEP%20policy%20statement%20
signed.pdf [https://perma.cc/RR85-YZKT] [hereinafter POLICY STATEMENT]. The
terms “RAND” and “FRAND” today are usually used interchangeably.
3
Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
4
Id. at 239–40 (explaining how the purpose of the challenged “call” rule
operated to protect the integrity of the Board’s price making). The Court dismissed the complaint.
5
NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (striking
down rule limiting the number of times a school could have its games televised).
6
See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, 486 U.S. 492 (1988)
(anticompetitive agreement in context of building materials standard setting); Am.
Soc’y Mch. Eng’rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982) (anticompetitive manipulation of standard setting process); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773
(1975) (use of lawyer ethics rules to fix price of title search); Radiant Burners, Inc.
v. People’s Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (sustaining allegation that
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In a particularly myopic decision involving the FRAND process, the Ninth Circuit made no attempt to understand that
process or how the antitrust laws could be used to protect it
from anticompetitive restraints.7 That was not entirely the
court’s fault. Part of the blame lies with the Antitrust Division
of the Justice Department, which intervened in the proceeding
and seemed more intent on protecting Qualcomm than the
competitive integrity of the FRAND process.8
While the FRAND process has been highly productive, it is
also fragile. Firms are tempted to make commitments at the
beginning when the incentive to join is large, but renege on
them later when they can profit by doing so. At least in this
particular case, private FRAND enforcement had not worked
very well. Qualcomm had been able to violate FRAND commitments in order to exclude rivals and obtain higher royalties
than FRAND would permit, largely with impunity. Other firms
will very likely follow Qualcomm’s lead. If that happens the
FRAND system will fall apart, doing irreparable injury to the
modern wireless telecommunications network or, at the very
least, diminishing the leadership role of the United States in
preserving effective network competition.
While governments can be heavily involved in standard setting,9 the implementation of technical standards in information
technologies is largely the work of private actors. Government
involvement is limited mainly to enforcement of contract, intellectual property, or antitrust law. As private actors, those involved in standard setting or compliance are fully subject to the
federal antitrust laws.
This Article addresses one question: when is an SSO participant’s violation of a FRAND commitment an antitrust violation, and if it is, of what kind and what are the implications for
remedies? It warns against two extremes. One is thinking that
any violation of a FRAND commitment is an antitrust violation
standard setting organization used process anticompetitively to exclude product
without regard to merit); United States v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 317 U.S. 519 (1943)
(government suit against AMA for standard opposing prepaid health care); see
also O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.
277 (2016) (striking down NCAA rule limiting athlete compensation); Wilk v. Am.
Med. Ass’n, 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir.1983) (striking down AMA standard intended to
exclude chiropractors).
7
Qualcomm, Inc. v. FTC, 969 F.3d 974, 2020 WL 4591476 (9th Cir. Aug. 11,
2020).
8
See United States’ Statement of Interest Concerning Qualcomm’s Motion
for Partial Stay of Injunction Pending Appeal, Qualcomm, Inc., 2020 WL 4591476
(No. 19-16122), 2019 WL 3306496.
9
2 HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST, supra note 1, § 35.01[C][1].
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as well. In the first instance FRAND obligations are contractual, and most breaches of contract do not violate any antitrust
law. The other extreme is thinking that, because a FRAND
violation is a breach of contract, it cannot also be an antitrust
violation. The question of an antitrust violation does not depend on whether the conduct breached a particular agreement
but rather on whether it caused competitive harm. This can
happen because the conduct restrained trade under section 1
of the Sherman Act, was unreasonably exclusionary under section 2 of the Sherman Act, or amounted to an anticompetitive
condition or understanding as defined by section 3 of the Clayton Act.10 The end goal is to identify practices that harm competition, thereby injuring consumers.
The Ninth Circuit’s Qualcomm decision will make antitrust
violations in the context of FRAND licensing much more difficult to prove, even in cases where anticompetitive behavior and
consumer harm seem clear.11 Indeed, in this case the court
itself acknowledged the harm to consumers but appeared to
think that they were not entitled to protection.12 If this decision stands, FRAND obligations will to a larger extent have to
be settled through private litigation and the federal antitrust
enforcement agencies will have a diminished role. Anticompetitive behavior by one firm that is not effectively disciplined will
lead others to do the same thing.
Not only did the Ninth Circuit reject application of the antitrust laws in this case, it also appeared to repudiate antitrust’s
consumer welfare principle, saying:
. . . [T]he district court correctly defined the relevant markets
as “the market for CDMA modem chips and the market for
premium LTE modem chips.” Nevertheless, its analysis of
Qualcomm’s business practices and their anticompetitive impact looked beyond these markets to the much larger market
of cellular services generally. Thus, a substantial portion of
the district court’s ruling considered alleged economic harms
to OEMs—who are Qualcomm’s customers, not its competitors—resulting in higher prices to consumers. These harms,
10
See Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2018) (condemning certain sales “on
the condition, agreement, or understanding” that the buyer will not deal in the
goods of a competitor). Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act is said to
reach everything that the Sherman Act reaches plus some additional conduct, but
we look mainly at Sherman and Clayton Act standards. 15 U.S.C. § 45; see FTC v.
Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
11
See Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d 974, 1003, 2020 WL 4591476 (declin[ing] to
ascribe antitrust liability in . . . dynamic and rapidly changing technology markets
without clearer proof of anticompetitive effect”).
12
See discussion infra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
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even if real, are not “anticompetitive” in the antitrust sense—
at least not directly—because they do not involve restraints
on trade or exclusionary conduct in “the area of effective
competition.”13

The quotation is from the Supreme Court’s decision in Ohio v.
American Express Co.,14 where the Supreme Court said only
that a relevant market is “the area of effective competition.” The
Ninth Circuit panel apparently believed that antitrust harm
could occur only to producers inside the relevant market,
which typically excludes most customers. The Ninth Circuit did
not quote the Supreme Court’s decision one year later in Apple
v. Pepper,15 that “Ever since Congress overwhelmingly passed
and President Benjamin Harrison signed the Sherman Act in
1890, ‘protecting consumers from monopoly prices” has been
“the central concern of antitrust.’ ”16
The very reason we condemn restraints under the antitrust
laws is because they result in lower output and higher prices,
harming consumers. The Ninth Circuit panel appeared to believe that higher prices for OEMs—that is, the manufacturer
customers who purchase chips for inclusion in their devices—
is not the kind of injury that concerns the antitrust laws.
Rather, it must be harm to competitors.
Customers are often, even typically, not producers in the
relevant market. Nevertheless, they are clearly antitrust’s protected class. For example, while exclusive dealing in the first
instance might deny selling opportunities to a rival producer,
we condemn it because it threatens price increases to their
buyers and those who purchase from them. Indeed, the reason
we have market power requirements in antitrust cases in the
first place is to distinguish harms to rivals that are likely to
result in market price increases from those that are not. Competitor exclusion in a competitive market is not an antitrust
violation because, while it injures the competitor is does no
consumer harm. That is the all-important difference between
business torts and antitrust law.
Patent holders who participate in SSOs generally agree to
provide timely disclosure of their patents or patent applications
that are reasonably expected to read on the participants’ tech13

Qualcomm, 969 F.3d at 992 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285 (2018).
15
149 S. Ct. 1514 (2019).
16
Id. at 1525 (quoting 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAW ¶345, at 179 (4th ed. 2014)).
14
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nology.17 They also agree in advance to license their patents
thought to be essential to the standard on FRAND terms.18 The
Patent Act itself does not impose this obligation. Patentees who
are not involved in SSOs have no obligation other than market
pressures to submit their patents to a standard or engage in
FRAND licensing.19
In networked technologies, however, these market pressures can be substantial. For example, if a patentee refuses to
commit its patented technology to an industry standard, the
SSO is likely to adopt a different standard that is not believed
to infringe those patents.20 Or if a patentee refuses to commit
to license a patent to all comers on a nondiscriminatory basis,
then the SSO may respond by seeking an alternative standard.21 These actions are driven by the SSO’s goal of competitive creation of a technology when interoperability among
17
On SSO members’ duty to disclose, see, for example, Qualcomm Inc. v.
Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004, 1015–19 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that
Qualcomm breached its duty to disclose patents that reasonably might be necessary to practice the standard); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 2012 WL
1672493, at *13 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2012) (holding that Apple sufficiently pled that
Samsung breached its duty to disclose intellectual property rights to the SSO);
Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J.
603, 628 (2007) (showing that SSOs may provide that “if members . . . do not
‘adequately and timely disclose’ essential patents, then those patents must be
licensed royalty-free.”) (citation omitted); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property
Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1919–21
(2002) (exploring the application of disclosure obligations and equitable estoppel
in the SSO context) [hereinafter Standard-Setting Organizations]; Peter S. Menell,
Economic Analysis of Network Effects and Intellectual Property, 34 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 219, 301–02 (2019) (comparing two cases alleging that SSO members
breached their disclosure duties);. However, establishing antitrust liability for
failure to disclose has proven difficult. See, e.g., Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d
456, 469 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding no antitrust liability for failure to predisclose
that simply increased prices but did not exclude a known technology); Wi-LAN
Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 382 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1023 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (“Allegations of
anticompetitive conduct based [on] a fraudulent FRAND declaration theory also
must satisfy [a] heightened pleading standard.”).
18
Questions about measurement of FRAND royalties have produced significant case law and literature but are outside the scope of this Article. For good
discussions, see Jorge L. Contreras, Fixing FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool Approach to
Standards-Based Patent Licensing, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 47, 78–87 (2013); Jorge L.
Contreras, Global Rate Setting: A Solution for Standards-Essential Patents, 94
WASH. L. REV. 701, 713–22 (2019). See generally Norman V. Siebrasse & Thomas
F. Cotter, The Value of the Standard, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1159 (2017).
19
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2018).
20
See D. Scott Bosworth et al., FRAND Commitments and Royalties for Standard Essential Patents, in COMPLICATIONS AND QUANDARIES IN THE ICT SECTOR: STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS AND COMPETITION ISSUES 19, 26 (A. Bharadwaj et al. eds.,
2018).
21
See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2012)
(“Microsoft II”) (citing Lemley, Standard-Setting Organizations, supra note 17 at
1902, 1906).
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diverse producers is a necessary component. Just as any producer, firms involved in the implementation of networked technology seek to minimize their costs by avoiding unnecessary or
unnecessarily costly patents. Such avoidance is a socially valuable form of cost minimization.
The FRAND obligation generally requires patentees to license freely to all qualified participants, whether or not they
are competitors of the patent holder.22 Further, they must settle royalty disputes in a reasonable manner—if necessary,
through a third party, such as a court or arbitrator.23 If reference to an arbitrator is contractually specified, such agreements may also be subject to compulsory arbitration under the
Federal Arbitration Act.24
The FRAND system facilitates competition by assuring new
firms as well as existing ones that they will be able to operate
on the networked technology. Royalties to the owners of these
patents are generally measured by the value that the contrib-

22
The IP policy of the Telecommunications Industry Association: stated: “A
license under any Essential Patent(s), the license rights which are held by the
undersigned Patent Holder, will be made available to all applicants under terms
and conditions that are reasonable and non-discriminatory.” FTC v. Qualcomm,
Inc., 2018 WL 5848999, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2018); accord Microsoft II, 696
F.3d at 876; id. at 885 (stating that FRAND obligation requires firm to license to
“all comers”); see also Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th
Cir. 2015) (“Microsoft III”) (“[A]n SEP holder cannot refuse a license to a manufacturer who commits to paying the RAND rate.”(emphasis added)); FTC v.
Qualcomm, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 671–72 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“For example,
under the intellectual property policy of the Telecommunications Industry Association (‘TIA’), a SSO, a SEP holder must commit to TIA that ‘A license under any
Essential Patent(s), the license rights which are held by the undersigned Patent
Holder, will be made available to all applicants under terms and conditions that
are reasonable and non-discriminatory.’” (quoting Qualcomm, Inc., 2018 WL
5848999, at *3).
23
See, e.g., HTC Corp. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, 2019 WL 277479,
at 3–5 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2019) (discussing duty to arbitrate), appeal dismissed,
2019 WL 4126536 (5th Cir. June 18, 2019); Interdigital Tech. Corp. v. Pegatron
Corp., 2016 WL 234433, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2016) (compelling arbitration);
ASUS Comput. Int’l v. InterDigital, Inc., 2015 WL 5186462, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 4,
2015) (similar); see also HOVENKAMP, ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST, supra note 1,
§ 35.05; Jorge L. Contreras & David L. Newman, Developing a Framework for
Arbitrating Standard-Essential Patent Disputes, 2014 J. DISP. RESOL. 23, 26–29
(2014); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable
Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1152–60
(2013). See generally J. Gregory Sidak, Mandating Final-Offer Arbitration of
FRAND Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2014)
(discussing Lemley-Shapiro arbitration).
24
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2018); see, e.g., ASUS Computer, 2015 WL 5186462, at
*2–3 (discussing the Federal Arbitration Act). See generally Contreras & Newman,
supra note 23, passim (same).
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uted patent makes to the standard.25 Importantly, tribunals
seek to measure these values “ex ante,” or prior to the patent’s
adoption into a standard and at a time when there is a fuller
range of competitive alternatives.26 Once the standard is
adopted and implementers have incorporated it into their own
technologies, a standard essential patent is likely to be in a
much stronger position, approaching monopoly in some
cases.27 Patents that are committed in this way are described
as “standard essential patents” (SEPs), or as being “FRAND
encumbered.”28 Qualcomm was able to evade this “ex ante”
requirement by insisting on purchaser acceptance of a license
on its own terms before it would sell chips.29
Having a patent declared standard essential can increase
its value considerably, mainly because the promise of a license
at a reasonable rate steers developmental decision making in
favor of that particular technology. When a firm makes a commitment to develop its products under a particular standard, it
wants assurance that it will have a durable right to operate
under that standard at reasonable royalty rates. This process
naturally leads to the creation of considerable path dependence
in standards. It encourages firms to develop their own technology in ways that ensure interoperability but that can be costly
to reverse after the fact.30
25
See, e.g., Microsoft III, 795 F.3d at 1040 (considering “the objective value
each [patent] contributed to each standard, given the quality of the technology
and the available alternatives as well as the importance of those technologies to
Microsoft’s business”); see also Thomas F. Cotter, Erik Hovenkamp & Norman
Siebrasse, Demystifying Patent Holdup, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501, 1507–08
(2019) (royalties generally reflect “the technology’s economic value”).
26
See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1325 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (“The hypothetical negotiation tries, as best as possible, to recreate the
ex ante licensing negotiation scenario and to describe the resulting agreement. In
other words, if infringement had not occurred, willing parties would have executed a license agreement specifying a certain royalty payment scheme.”);
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 2013 WL 2111217, at *17–20 (W.D. Wash. Apr.
25, 2013) (“This approach attempts to ascertain the royalty upon which the parties would have agreed had they successfully negotiated an agreement just before
infringement began.”).
27
See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent
Pools, and Standard Setting, 1 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 119, 122–24. (2000).
28
E.g., FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 2017 WL 2774406, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 26,
2017).
29
See discussion infra text at notes 103–04.
30
Cotter, Hovenkamp, & Siebrasse, supra note 25, at 1562–63. On path
dependence, see Steven N. Durlauf, Path Dependence, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 10094 (3d ed. 2018); Douglas Puffert, Path Dependence in
Technical Standards, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 10106,
10106–13 (3d ed. 2018). On standardization and path dependence, see generally
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This phenomenon of increased value for SEPs also motivates patent owning firms to “over-claim”—that is, to assert
that patents are standard essential when subsequent litigation
or evaluation determines that they are not. While FRAND
agreements require participants to declare relevant patents
thought to be essential, the rate of actual declaration far exceeds any rational boundary. As many as one-third to more
than half of declared SEPs are very likely not essential to the
standard for which they were declared,31 and allegations about
the practice of over-declaring are currently being litigated as
potential antitrust violations.32 In fact, overall infringement
rates for SEP patents are not materially different from those for
non-SEP patents.33 A declaration of non-infringement means
that, although the patent might be valid, it does not in fact read
on the defendant’s particular device or process. In effect, the
patent is not a part of the defendant’s technology, and thus
cannot be essential. The problem is exacerbated by the fact
that, for the most part, SSOs have no process up front for
reviewing or questioning individual participants’ declarations
that a patent they are offering is in fact both valid and standard
essential.34
Ex ante, a patent may offer one of many alternative technological paths to a certain goal. However, ex post, after a standard has been adopted and others have developed their
technologies in reliance, the range of acceptable alternatives
Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation,
16 RAND J. ECON. 70 passim (1985).
31
See Robin Stitzing, Pekka Saaskilahti, Jimmy Royer & Marc Van
Audenrode, Over-Declaration of Standard Essential Patents and Determinants of
Essentiality fig. 1(Sept. 4, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=2951617 [https://perma.cc/B9BQ-EV9C]; see also CYBER CREATIVE
INST. CO., EVALUATION OF LTE ESSENTIAL PATENTS DECLARED TO ETSI 19–21 (2013),
http://www.cybersoken.com/file/lte03EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VP6-264A]
(concluding that roughly 56% of patents declared essential to ETSI standard were
in fact so and showing that there was also a wide range among individual companies). For good commentary, see Jorge L. Contreras, Essentiality and StandardsEssential Patents, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW:
COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS 209, 226 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2017).
32
Lenovo (United States), Inc. v. Interdigital Tech. (IDC), case 1:20-cv-00593LPS (D. Del. April 9, 2020) (complaint, alleging over-declaring by IDC). See also
https://www.essentialpatentblog.com/2020/04/lenovo-motorola-file-antitrustclaims-against-interdigitals-standards-setting-participation-and-patent-licens
ing-practice-lenovo-v-interdigital/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2020) (discussing the case).
33
Mark A. Lemley & Timothy Simcoe, How Essential are Standard-Essential
Patents?, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 607, 627 (2019). The authors conclude that findings of infringement of SEP and non-SEP patents occur at about the same rate,
roughly 30%. As a result, SEPs “don’t seem to be all that essential, at least when
they make it to court.” Id. at 608.
34
See id. at 610.
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can decrease dramatically. As a result, the patent whose path
is adopted becomes much more valuable.35 In that case, a
firm’s ability to evade the FRAND obligation by charging selectively higher royalties to some licensees or conditioning licenses on the purchase of other technology can be extremely
lucrative for the patentee but costly to implementers of the
standard and disruptive of the SSO’s developmental goals.36 In
its Qualcomm decision noted above, the Ninth Circuit did not
indicate any awareness of these motivations or their potential
for harm.37
In general, the goal of FRAND is to make patents available
to participants at a price equivalent to what the patent would
have been worth in the more competitive market prior to the
time it was declared essential. The relevant question is what
was the value of the patent’s contribution to the standard at a
time when competitive alternatives may have been available, as
opposed to a later time when other firms have dedicated themselves to the standard?38
This approach is simply a variant of the proposition that
even a monopoly market can be made competitive if we require
competing firms to bid for the opportunity to be the monopolist.39 Even though a natural monopoly entity such as a public
utility has the market power of any monopolist, someone must
still choose who gets to be the monopolist.40 The winner will be
the firm that promises the most competitive behavior, provided
that it can be held to that commitment. Once the auction is
over and the winner has been selected, however, it will have an
incentive to renege on its auction promise and charge whatever
35
See Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND’s Forever: Standards, Patent
Transfers, and Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L.J. 231, 233–35 (2014); William
F. Lee & A. Douglas Melamed, Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Patent Damages, 101
CORNELL L. REV. 385, 404–09 (2016); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent
Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1994–2010 (2007).
36
See, e.g., FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 785–87 (N.D. Cal.
2019) (finding that defendant attempted to leverage higher royalty rates by taking
advantage of ex post SEP status plus its threat to withhold products from licensee
who challenged the higher rates).
37
See discussion supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text.
38
See Cotter, Hovenkamp & Siebrasse, supra note 25, at 1517–29.
39
See Erik Hovenkamp, Tying, Exclusivity, and Standard-Essential Patents,
19 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 79, 90 (2017); Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate
Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55, 58 (1968); Richard A. Posner, The Appropriate Scope
of Regulation in the Cable Television Industry, 3 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 98,
110–11 (1972); Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies—
in General and with Respect to CATV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73, 76–77 (1976).
40
On whether the large internet platforms are natural monopolies, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, 130 YALE L.J. (forthcoming
2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3639142.
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price its newly acquired monopoly status provides. FRAND
creates similar incentives, as the Qualcomm case illustrates.
Alternative proposals to the effect that the FRAND patentee
and the licensee should split the difference between value to
the patentee and value to the implementer41 improperly take
an ex post rather than ex ante view of value and asks the
royalty tribunal to divide evenly the difference between the
seller’s (patentee’s) willingness to accept and the buyer’s (licensee’s) willingness to pay after FRAND status has been established. That may be a useful way of thinking about price in a
bilateral monopoly,42 but only after the bilateral monopoly has
formed. The competitive solution is to give the seller the price it
would have obtained in a competitive market, which is manifestly not an even division of the surplus. Rather, it is a competitive return to the seller.43
The SEP process has produced several disputes. Often
these are simply about the size of the royalty and how it must
be measured. However, patentees may also attempt to evade
the general FRAND requirements that a SEP must be licensed
without condition to all users of the standard and on nondiscriminatory terms. Some owners of SEPs who also make products that practice them may prefer not to license a particular
patent to anyone. Or they may impose exclusive dealing or
loyalty discount requirements on licensees.44 Alternatively, the
owner of a FRAND-encumbered patent may tie it to an unregu41
See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, What Makes FRAND Fair? The Just Price Contract Formation, and the Division of Surplus from Voluntary Exchange, 4 CRITERION
J. INNOVATION 701, 727–31 (2019) (analyzing difference surplus splits).
42
The traditional solutions to the bilateral monopoly problem are ones in
which output is joint maximizing but price is indeterminate within a significant
range. See Roger D. Blair, David L. Kaserman, & Richard E. Romano, A Pedagogical Treatment of Bilateral Monopoly, 55 S. ECON. J. 831, 834 (1989). However,
Nash-Cournot bargaining theory predicts that under a wide range of assumptions
bargaining will lead to an even split of the difference. That makes it critical that
the proper beginning parameters of bargaining be settled. The split prior to a SEP
declaration will occur at a lower place than it will ex post because the patentee’s
(seller’s) reservation price will be lower. See Gordon C. Rausser, Johan Swinnen,
& Pinhas Zusman, The Nash Solution to the Bargaining Problem, in POLITICAL
POWER AND ECONOMIC POLICY: THEORY, ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS 30–49
(2011). For a comprehensive empirical survey of experimental tests, see PoHsuan Lin et al., General Economic Principles of Bargaining and Trade: Evidence
from 2000 Classroom Experiments (Sept. 15, 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3250495.
43
E.g., Demsetz, supra note 39, at 65; Posner, supra note 39, at 111 (stating
that franchise bidding leads to “a price that will not include any monopoly toll”).
44
On these practices when involving SEPs, see Erik Hovenkamp, Tying, Exclusivity, supra note 39, at 107–09; A. Douglas Melamed & Carl Shapiro, How
Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective, 127 YALE L.J. 2110,
2126–28 (2018).
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lated device. While FRAND license rates are determined by a
third-party tribunal, product prices are not. By tying a patent
license to its own manufactured device, the patentee might be
able to obtain its full post-commitment monopoly return. In
that case the seller can obtain an overcharge on the device that
operates to offset the reduced FRAND royalty. This use of tying
in this way to avoid regulated rates is well known in antitrust.45
The owner of a FRAND patent may also refuse to license it to
competitors in the market for devices that practice the patent,
once again in violation of its FRAND obligation to license to all
qualified users on nondiscriminatory terms.46 The result is
reduced competition in the downstream market for devices or
processes that employ the patent at issue, and in extreme
cases even the creation of monopoly.
While these various attempts to evade FRAND obligations
very likely breach the patentee’s contractual obligations, only a
subset also constitute antitrust violations. This does not mean
that the standard-setting and FRAND process in which the
conduct occurred is irrelevant to antitrust analysis. To the
contrary, as in any antitrust case, it forms part of the market
environment in which conduct must be evaluated. In her 2019
Qualcomm decision, Judge Lucy Koh addressed tying and exclusive dealing claims under general antitrust principles, and
refusal to deal claims under the standards that the Supreme
Court had developed in its Aspen47 and Trinko48 decisions.49
Although her opinion devoted considerable space to the importance of standard essential patents and the relevance of
FRAND commitments, she addressed the antitrust claims by
applying well established antitrust principles that require a
showing of restraint of trade or anticompetitive exclusion.50
Nevertheless, anticompetitive effects become more transparent
when one views the extent to which they undermined an output- and innovation-enhancing joint enterprise whose social
value was not being called into question.
45
On the use of tying arrangements for rate regulation avoidance, see 9
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1715b, (4th ed. 2018).
On this use in the context of FRAND, see Hovenkamp, supra note 39, at 102–105;
Melamed & Shapiro, supra note 44, at 28.
46
See supra note 22.
47
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
48
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP 540 U.S.
398 (2004).
49
FTC v. Qualcomm Corp., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 696–97 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
50
See infra text accompanying notes 98–107; see also 2 HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP
AND ANTITRUST, supra note 1, § 35.05.
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SSOs operated by multiple firms are joint ventures.51 For
bona fide joint ventures that are not simply fronts for cartels,
the purpose of the antitrust laws is not to destroy the venture
or undermine its purpose, but rather to evaluate how the challenged restraint operates within the venture and condemn unreasonably harmful restraints.52 For example, when the
Supreme Court struck down the NCAA joint venture’s limitation on nationally televised football games, the purpose and
effect were to make the NCAA behave more competitively, in the
process increasing its output.53 SSOs should be addressed in
the same manner. The goal of the standard setting venture is
to facilitate competitive operation and entry, interoperability,
as well as preserve appropriate competitive incentives for research and development.
Antitrust analysis necessarily involves testing conduct
against these goals, but only to the extent of looking for practices that are anticompetitive. This means it must identify
practices that reduce market wide output unreasonably and
increase prices, or that are unnecessarily exclusionary or
harmful to consumers in other ways.
A firm’s violation of its FRAND commitment is very likely a
breach of contract, as several decisions have held.54 The
FRAND contract is incomplete, in the sense that not every term
is specified in detail. But participants are subject to a contractual duty to bargain in good faith, with some terms being filled
in by courts or other tribunals as necessary. The breach of
contract question does not depend on whether the conduct
reduced market output or excluded a rival unreasonably. It
certainly does not depend on the existence of any party’s market power. Remedies are ordinarily contract damages or an
injunction. Nonparties to the contract will typically be able to
obtain relief only to the extent that they are third-party beneficiaries. However, the courts have had little difficulty concluding that participating members of the SSO are third-party
51
For treatment of SSOs as joint ventures, see 13 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 1, Ch. 22B, 22C; Melamed & Shapiro, supra note 28, at 2119.
52
See 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, Ch. 15 (4th
ed. 2017).
53
See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
54
E.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 889 (9th Cir. 2012); In
re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 903, 923 (N.D. Ill.
2013); see also Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 998,
1005, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (holding that FRAND commitment was an enforceable contract precluding patentee from bringing ITC claim for infringement before it
offered a license).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3420925

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-6\CRN603.txt

1696

unknown

Seq: 14

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

3-NOV-20

7:42

[Vol. 105:1683

beneficiaries of FRAND commitments.55 In all events, challengers will not be able to obtain antitrust law’s treble damages
unless they can prove an antitrust violation.
Whether a firm’s breach of a FRAND commitment also violates the antitrust laws depends on whether the conduct in
question causes competitive harm of a sort that the antitrust
laws recognize.56 In the case of section 1 of the Sherman Act57
this requires a showing of a relevant agreement that is likely to
reduce market output. If the conduct is reasonably ancillary to
other arguably procompetitive activity, the court must also assess market power and anticompetitive effects. In the case of
section 2 of the Sherman Act or section 3 of the Clayton Act,
which reach mainly tying and exclusive dealing, it will require a
showing of market power plus conduct that is unreasonably
exclusionary.
The antitrust harm results, not from the breach of the
FRAND obligation per se. Rather, it results from the creation of
monopoly and higher prices for consumers. The Ninth Circuit
got this issue precisely wrong, holding that the district court
incorrectly focused on downstream harm to buyers when it
should have looked at harm to rivals.58 That confuses contract
or tort law with antitrust law.
I
FRAND VIOLATIONS AND ANTITRUST
A few FRAND violations that might also be challengeable as
antitrust violations involve royalty disputes or entitlement to
an injunction.59 Many fall into the general category of refusals
to deal or discriminatory dealing. These come in many kinds,
and the differences are important for antitrust purposes. Unilateral refusals—where one firm acting alone refuses to deal—
55
See, e.g., Realtek Semiconductor Corp.,946 F. Supp. 2d at 1005–06 (holding that product developer was third-party beneficiary entitled to enforce FRAND
obligation); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1032–33
(W.D. Wash. 2012) (similar); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 2012 WL
5416941, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 29, 2012) (similar).
56
E.g., McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 813 (9th Cir. 1988)
(finding that the supplier’s breach of contract was not an antitrust violation because it did not cause competitive harm); Orion Pictures Distribution Corp. v.
Syufy Enters., 829 F.2d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that although defendant’s conduct was a breach of contract, it did not violate the antitrust laws in the
absence of market power).
57
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
58
Qualcomm, Inc. v. FTC, 969 F.3d 974, 2020 WL 4591476 (9th Cir. Aug. 11,
2020).
59
See infra text accompanying notes 69–72.
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are found to be antitrust violations less frequently than concerted refusals to license, or boycotts, which occur when two or
more firms acting in concert refuse to deal.60 In addition, refusals to deal can be both simple and conditional.61 Discriminatory dealing occurs when a firm deals under different terms
with different contracting partners, such as competitors and
noncompetitors, in a way that harms competition. FRAND
nondiscrimination requirements are significantly stronger than
those imposed by the antitrust laws alone and prevent firms
from licensing FRAND-encumbered patent selectively to
noncompetitors.
A.

Refusals to Deal

Although the Patent Act has provisions relevant to refusals
to license,62 in general a refusal to license a patent is simply a
subset of refusals to deal A simple refusal is one where the
holder refuses to deal no matter what, or where the refusal is
conditioned on a firm’s status that cannot readily be changed.
For example, a firm might agree to sell to competitors but not
noncompetitors. The only way a competing firm could obtain a
deal in that case would be to exit from the market in which it
was competing.
By contrast, conditional refusals to deal are actions in
which the rights holder expresses a willingness to deal only if
some condition is met. The basis for antitrust attacks on conditional refusals is much broader than for unconditional refusals. Tying and exclusive dealing are two common examples.
Section 3 of the Clayton Act, the provision historically used to
condemn tying and exclusive dealing, makes it unlawful to sell
something only on the “condition, agreement, or understanding” that the purchaser not deal in the goods of a competitor.63
In the only place where the Sherman and Clayton Acts mention
patents, this provision makes clear that its refusal-to-deal rule
applies to things “whether patented or unpatented.”64 Nevertheless, section 3’s coverage is limited to “goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities.”65
Because FRAND obligations by design are not tied to any particular good, section 3 of the Clayton Act does not cover the
60
On concerted refusals to deal, see generally 13 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra
note 1, ¶¶ 2201–05.
61
See infra text accompanying notes 63–66.
62
See infra text accompanying notes 69–70.
63
15 U.S.C. § 14.
64
See id.
65
Id.
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conditional refusal to license a FRAND patent, unless the condition in question is tied to “goods, wares,” etc.66
In any event, these same requirements have largely been
read into the more general language of the Sherman Act which
contains no limitation on its coverage. This explains why cases
such as Qualcomm, dealing with refusal to license FRAND patents, proceed largely under the Sherman Act,67 or in the case of
FTC proceedings under section 5 of the FTC Act.68 Just as the
Sherman Act, that statute’s prohibition of unfair methods of
competition contains no limitation respecting patents, and it
reaches all practices that are covered by the Sherman Act.
When the subject of the deal is a patent, the Patent Act
itself may also be relevant. The Patent Act does not create an
antitrust immunity for unilateral refusals to license, although
it does immunize certain “misuse” claims. The Patent Misuse
Reform Act provides that:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement
or contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief
or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent
right by reason of his having . . . refused to license or use any
rights to the patent . . . .69

Patent “misuse” is a judge-made set of rules that emanated
entirely from the Patent Act. While many of these resembled
antitrust rules, they often reached beyond antitrust law.70 The
quoted provision, which is part of the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act,71 was intended to limit the reach of patent misuse.
66
The full language of section 3 of the Clayton Act makes clear that, in the
case of tying, both the tying and tied products must be “goods, wares, merchandise,” etc.: “It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to lease or make a sale or
contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other
commodities, whether patented or unpatented, . . . on the condition, agreement,
or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the
goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or competitors . . . .” Id.
67
FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 683 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
68
15 U.S.C. § 45.
69
35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2018).
70
On patent “misuse,” see 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, Ch. 3 (3d
ed. 2017 & Supp.); 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
¶¶ 1781–1782 (4th ed. 2018); DARYL LIM, PATENT MISUSE AND ANTITRUST LAW: EMPIRICAL, DOCTRINAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES 18–37 (2013). On the reach of misuse
beyond antitrust law, see, for example, Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d
661, 670–71 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that tying arrangement could constitute
misuse and be a defense to an infringement claim even though it did not constitute an antitrust violation).
71
35 U.S.C. § 271(d).
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Today patent misuse is in sharp decline and there are few
recent cases finding misuse.72
Whether this provision of the Patent Misuse Reform Act
should additionally be read to confer an antitrust immunity is
doubtful. More realistically, it should be interpreted as an attempt to narrow misuse liability so as to bring it more in line
with antitrust principles.73 When Congress wants to create an
antitrust immunity it knows how to do so. Several statutes
provide that the antitrust laws “do not apply” to a particular
type of conduct, or that particular conduct “shall not be unlawful under the antitrust laws.”74 Here, by contrast, the statutory
language removes liability for “misuse or illegal extension of the
patent right,”75 which is classical misuse language. Given the
principle that immunities are construed narrowly, the statute
should be construed as narrowing misuse doctrine but not
antitrust rules.76
In any event, this statutory limitation applies only to unconditional refusals to license. The very next subsection of the
same statute, passed at the same time, also states that misuse
should not apply to a firm that:
(5) condition[s] the license of any rights to the patent or the
sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a license to
rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product,
unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has
market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned.77

Far from exonerating conditional refusals, this subsection
of the statute requires that conditional refusals involving tying
be condemned only upon a finding of market power in the
product upon which the condition is imposed—that is, the ty72

See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 70, ¶ 1781.
See Richard Calkins, Patent Law: The Impact of the 1988 Patent Misuse
Reform Act and Noerr-Pennington Doctrine on Misuse Defenses and Antitrust Counterclaims, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 175, 220–28 (1989) (making this argument).
74
See, e.g., Charitable Donation Antitrust Immunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 37(a)
(“[T]he antitrust laws . . . shall not apply to charitable gift annuities . . . .”);
Confirmation of Antitrust Status of Graduate Medical Resident Matching Programs, 15 U.S.C. § 37b(2) (“It shall not be unlawful under the antitrust laws to
sponsor . . . .”); see also 1B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
¶¶ 249–51 (4th ed. 2013) (discussing other federal statutes with express immunity provisions).
75
35 U.S.C. § 27(d)(4).
76
See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 258 (1996) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Grp. Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 231
(1979) (“It is well settled that exemptions from the antitrust laws are to be narrowly construed.”).
77
35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (emphasis added).
73
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ing product. In its Illinois Tool Works decision the Supreme
Court held that this provision, written as a limitation on the
reach of misuse law, also served to undermine the notion that
the market power requirement for antitrust tying law is established simply by showing that the tying product was patented.78 With the misuse law of tying having been narrowed by
requiring conventional proof of market power, it would be perverse to have antitrust reach more broadly.79 As a result, the
Court held market power could not be presumed in an antitrust tying case from the bare existence of a patent.80 Nothing
in Illinois Tool Works suggested that patent ties should simply
be legal per se.
Suppose the owner of a FRAND-encumbered patent conditions a license on some agreement or understanding that antitrust law deems anticompetitive or else refuses to license it
under any circumstances? The first of these is a conditional
refusal; the second is an unconditional refusal.
1.

Conditional Refusals to License FRAND-encumbered
Patents

An unlawful conditional refusal occurs when the defendant
refuses to sell or license some interest unless the buyer agrees
to a condition that is determined to be anticompetitive. Conditional refusal challenges usually involve tying, exclusive dealing, or a variety of practices sometimes described as “quasi”
exclusive dealing, including conditional discounts, loyalty discounts, bundled discounts, most-favored nation clauses, and
the like.81 The purely vertical conditional refusal is addressed
under ordinary rule of reason antitrust principles, which require a showing of market power and anticompetitive effects.
The immediate target of such practices is typically a rival, but
the end game, as for any antitrust violation, is reduced output
78
Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42–46
(2006).
79
See id. at 38–39, 42.
80
Id. at 42 (“[G]iven the fact that the patent misuse doctrine provided the
basis for the market power presumption, it would be anomalous to preserve the
presumption in antitrust after Congress has eliminated its foundation” (citing 10
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 70, ¶ 1737c)).
81
On tying, see 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 45, ch. 17; 10 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 70, ch. 17. On exclusive dealing, see 11 PHILLIP E. AREEDA
& HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, Ch. 8 (4th ed. 2018). For a discussion of
conditional discounts and other practices sometimes analogized to tying or exclusive dealing, see 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 749
(4th ed. 2015) (bundled discounts); 11 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra ¶ 1807 (various discounts conditioned on exclusivity or preferential treatment).
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and higher prices to consumers. These requirements apply
whether any patents in question are FRAND encumbered or,
indeed, whether there are any patents at all.82
In speaking of Qualcomm’s practices targeting Apple, as
well as other OEMs, the district court concluded that in 2013
Qualcomm gave Apple rebates “in exchange for Apple’s effective
commitment to purchase modem chips exclusively from
Qualcomm.”83 It was particularly important for Qualcomm to
secure Apple’s exclusive business, the court concluded, because of Apple’s scale and prestige.84 This condition foreclosed
competitor Intel and other unnamed rivals from working with
Apple for approximately three years.85 That practice falls literally within Clayton Act section 3’s prohibition of anticompetitive tying and exclusive dealing of products, even though the
case at hand was brought under section 5 of the FTC Act.86
The Sherman Act condemns this conduct under more or less
the same standard.87
Modern interpretations of the law of exclusive dealing and
quasi-exclusive dealing look to foreclosure of rivals as the primary tool of competitive harm.88 “Foreclosure” is the idea that
a vertical contract imposed by a dominant firm either drives a
rival out of a market or else makes its business more costly. As
Judge Koh observed in Qualcomm, the requirement for illegality
is “not total foreclosure, but whether the challenged practices
bar a substantial number of rivals or severely restrict the market’s ambit.”89
The judicially developed foreclosure requirements under
section 1 of the Sherman Act differ from those under section 2.
Section 1 does not require that the actor have substantial monopoly power but is more categorical about what constitutes
82
See FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 743–44 (N.D. Cal. 2019)
(holding that conditional market share discounts in exchange for chip purchase
commitments violated antitrust laws when in some cases, Qualcomm conditioned
chip sales on patent licenses at supracompetitive rates), rev’d, 969 F.3d 974,
2020 WL 4591476 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2020).
83
Qualcomm, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 730.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
See id. at 680.
87
See 11 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 81, ¶ 1800c4 (noting divisions
among the lower courts as to whether the test of illegality is the same under the
two statutes).
88
See 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 42, ¶¶ 1720–1730 (tying, under
both per se rule and rule of reason); 11 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 81
¶¶ 1802, 1821 (exclusive dealing).
89
Qualcomm, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 696 (quoting United States v. Dentsply Int’l,
Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 191 (3d Cir. 2005)).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3420925

R

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-6\CRN603.txt

1702

unknown

Seq: 20

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

3-NOV-20

7:42

[Vol. 105:1683

the requisite foreclosure. Judge Koh suggested minimum foreclosure on the order of 40% to 50% of the relevant market.90
Stated as a minimum, that number seems high, particularly in
a market where interoperability is crucial to success.91 In any
event, when the defendant has a dominant position in its own
market, then the foreclosure requirement is less categorical.92
First, it may be established on lower foreclosure numbers.93
Secondly, the court may look at other factors such as the exclusion of specific important rivals.94 The duration of the
agreements is important, and at least some of the Qualcomm
agreements, those involving Apple, stretched for five years.95
Finally, the quality of the entity or entities from which rivals are
foreclosed is also significant: one impact of exclusive dealing
can be to relegate rivals to inferior market alternatives, thus
raising rivals’ costs.96 The court also concluded that
Qualcomm attempted to—and largely succeeded in—denying
rivals market access to Apple, a highly preferred purchaser.97
The court also found that Qualcomm’s various actions cutting off customers’ (OEMs’) chip supply unless they agreed to
chip exclusivity effectively foreclosed these OEMs from
purchasing chips from Qualcomm’s rivals.98 Further, it conditioned the sale of modem chips to Apple on its agreement not to
use a competing standard that Intel was supporting.99
90
Id. at 764 (citing Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp.
LP, 592 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2010); Feitelson v. Google Inc., 80 F. Supp. 3d
1019, 1031 (N.D. Cal. 2015)).
91
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 69–70 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(suggesting 40% to 50%). The Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines promulgated by the
Department of Justice and FTC would permit challenges on foreclosures of as
little as 20%. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, DRAFT VERTICAL
MERGER GUIDELINES § 3, https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2020/01/jointvertical-merger-guidelines-draft-released-public-comment [https://perma.cc/
NA24-ZL8R].
92
On these differences between exclusive contracting under sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act, see 3B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
¶ 768 (4th ed. 2015).
93
See Qualcomm, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 764.
94
Id. at 765 (quoting ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 266 (3d
Cir. 2012) (quoting 11 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 81, ¶ 1802c (2d ed.
2002))).
95
Id. at 770.
96
See 11 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 81 ¶ 1821d; see also, e.g.,
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 70 (finding that Microsoft’s actions foreclosed Netscape’s
access to the most efficient distribution channels).
97
See supra text accompanying notes 83–85.
98
Qualcomm, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 698.
99
Id. at 723 (also mentioning other unspecified exclusive deals with Apple);
see also id., at 730, 737 (“Thus, Qualcomm’s exclusive deals, which delayed
Intel’s ability to sell modem chips to Apple until September 2016, foreclosed Intel
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Qualcomm eventually forced Apple to stop doing business with
Intel.100
Foreclosure concerns are heightened in networks where
compatibility standards and interoperability are essential to
competitive supply. The FRAND process ensures that all participating firms have access to a common technology so that
they can operate on a network where interconnection is essential. As a result, foreclosure can be much more harmful in a
networked industry than elsewhere. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court,101 concluding that while the agreements in question were a type of exclusive dealing, they were in
fact de minimis because Apple, the intended target, was the
only customer in play, and the only rival chip maker was Intel.
But foreclosure must be measured as a proportion of the market that is excluded by the deal. The fact that the market has
only two competitors exacerbates rather than diminishes the
effects of foreclosure. In a footnote the Ninth Circuit conceded:
Of note, the agreements did not just provide substantial discounts to Apple in exchange for Apple “purchas[ing] a high
percentage of [its] . . . requirements from” Qualcomm. Allied
Orthopedic, 592 F.3d at 996. Instead, they sought to “prevent[ ] the buyer [Apple] from purchasing a given good [CDMA
modem chips] from any other vendor,” id., by making volume
discounts (or “incentive funds”) contingent on exclusivity.
Nor were these agreements “easily terminable,” even though
Apple did, in fact, terminate them. See id. at 997 (noting that
“[t]he ‘easy terminability’ of an exclusive dealing arrangement
‘negate[s] substantially [its] potential to foreclose competition’ ” (quoting Omega Envtl., 127 F.3d at 1163–64)). Clearly,
the requirement that Apple forfeit or reimburse Qualcomm
millions of dollars in incentive funds was a strong deterrent
to termination.

The footnote contradicts the statements that the court
made in the text of its opinion. Section 3 of the Clayton Act
applies its prohibition against exclusive dealing even when the
and other rivals from benefits including: (1) a revenue boost critical to funding
research and development and acquiring technology (as Intel did with VIA); (2)
exposure to Apple’s “best-in-class” engineering resources; (3) a foothold at Apple
for future handsets; (4) business opportunities with other OEMs; (5) enhanced
standing in SSOs; and (6) opportunities to conduct early field testing and
prototyping with network vendors and operators.”).
100
See id. at 766 (showing that Qualcomm’s exclusive deals with Apple “foreclosed a substantial share of the market”); id. at 766–67 (showing the foreclosure
of other rivals).
101
FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 969 F.3d 974, 2020 WL 4591476 (9th Cir. Aug. 11,
2020).
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defendant offers “a discount from, or rebate upon” a price in
exchange for an exclusive dealing or tying agreement.102 That
is, the fact that a firm may subsequently be shown to be capable of buying itself out of an exclusivity provision does not
negate its anticompetitive effect. The standard under FTC Act
§5 should be at least as aggressive.
The Ninth Circuit made a similar error with respect to
Qualcomm’s “no license, no chips” policy, under which
Qualcomm refused to sell chips to an OEM unless it also
agreed to take a Qualcomm license. One important goal of that
policy, as the district court had found, was to enable
Qualcomm to evade FRAND-determined royalties, which would
have been significantly lower than the royalties that Qualcomm
was actually able to obtain.103 The Ninth Circuit characterized
this as “chip neutral” because it could apply to anyone’s chips,
not just Qualcomm’s. But the fact is that Qualcomm had a
dominant market share in chips, and tying law usually finds
competitive significance in markets shares in the range of 30%
to 40%. In sum, the practice both amounted to classical tying
and FRAND royalty avoidance.104
In any event, FRAND obligations reach much more broadly
than do antitrust obligations. For example, a refusal to license
a FRAND patent to a qualified licensee unless that person also
purchases the IP owner’s hardware would very likely violate a
FRAND commitment “per se,” as a simple breach of contract.
Breach of the agreement would be unlawful without any showing of higher prices, market power, a minimum foreclosure
amount, or another anticompetitive effect such as raising a
rival’s costs.
In the case of a FRAND violation alone, the remedy could
be a nonantitrust penalty for breach of contract, as well as a
mandatory or prohibitory injunction.105 Absent a finding of an
102

15 U.S.C. § 14 (2018).
See FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 2017 WL 2774406 (N.D.Cal. June 26, 2017) at
*13. The court stated:
Qualcomm’s “no license-no chips” policy prevents OEMs from
resorting to a neutral arbiter to determine a reasonable royalty rate,
an OEMs’ bilateral licensing negotiations with Qualcomm do not
occur “in the shadow of the law,” and thus do not adequately reflect
a reasonable FRAND royalty rate.
Id.
104
For further analysis, see HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST, supra note 1,
§ 35.05[B] (2020 Supp.).
105
See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)
(holding that the right to an injunction should be established by traditional equity
principles, namely that “(1) that [the plaintiff] has suffered an irreparable injury;
(2) that remedies available at law . . . are inadequate to compensate for that injury;
103
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antitrust violation, however, it would not be amenable to antitrust’s treble damages.106 Nor would a simple breach of a
FRAND obligation be governed by the provisions that govern
private equity relief from antitrust violations.107 It would also
not be governed by the very broad provision that gives the
Attorney General the authority to obtain an injunction against
an ongoing antitrust violation without making the usual showing that equitable principles favored the requested relief.108
That provision does not contain the limitation that appears in
most statutory authorizations for an injunction that empowers
the court to grant them “in accordance with the principles of
equity.”109
Although the fact that a patent is FRAND-encumbered
does not determine antitrust liability in either direction, it is
hardly irrelevant. On the market power question, the fact that
a patent has been declared standard essential and subjected to
FRAND requirements is certainly important. Depending on the
degree of path dependence, a patent may have become essential to practicing a particular standard, or implementers may
have invested substantial sunk costs into the technology it
covers.110 In that case, extraction may be more costly than
simply paying more, or else the firm may exit from the market.111 These are all fact questions, but they can weigh heavily
in a determination of market power.
(3) that considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant,
a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be
disserved by a permanent injunction.”).
106
15 U.S.C. § 15 (2018).
107
Articulated in 15 U.S.C. § 26:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue
for and have injunctive relief . . . against threatened loss or damage
by a violation of the antitrust laws, . . . when and under the same
conditions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened
conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceedings, and upon the
execution of proper bond against damages for an injunction improvidently granted and a showing that the danger of irreparable loss or
damage is immediate, a preliminary injunction may issue. . . .
Id. § 26.
108
15 U.S.C. § 25 (authorizing government to “prevent and restrain” future
antitrust violations without a separate showing of public interest or the usual
language in equity statutes that grants the authority).
109
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 283 (patent infringement); 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (allowing
injunction to prevent trademark infringement—”according to the principles of
equity”); 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2018) (empowering federal courts of appeal to enforce
orders of the NLRB “as [they] deem[ ] just and proper”).
110
See Cotter, Hovenkamp, & Siebrasse, supra note 25, at 1509–10.
111
See FTC, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 60–61 (2011); Jorge L. Contreras, Much Ado About Hold-up,
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We suggest that FRAND status creates a presumption of
sufficient market power, which can be defeated by a showing
that firms operating under the SSO can find a suitable substitute for the FRAND-encumbered patent in question, readily
and at low cost. For example, the presumption would likely be
defeated by a finding that firms operating under the standard
are not infringers, which is simply another way of saying that
the patent has been mis-declared as standard essential.112
Questions about the market power of individual SEP patents are also heavily derivative of questions about the power of
the SSO for which the patent is essential. If a patent is truly
essential, then it has whatever power is enjoyed by the standard to which it is essential. Most large SSOs that employ
SEPs and dominate their industries have significant power. In
that case, a properly identified SEP can be presumed to have
market power as well. In many other settings, however, standards are less likely to confer substantial power for the simple
reason that the organization is only one of many alternative
standard setting organizations, or else because compliance
with a standard is not all that valuable.113 For example, the
Blu-ray Disc Association (BDA) is an SSO for those involved in
developing technology and manufacturing under the Blu-ray
format for compact discs.114 However, the Blu-ray format has
been in sharp decline in recent years, losing ground to alternative video formats as well as streaming.115 In that case, determining the lock that any particular patent or technology has on
the Blu-ray standard will not necessarily dispose of the market
2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 875, 882; Anne Layne-Farrar, Gerard Llobet & A. Jorge
Padilla, Preventing Patent Hold Up: An Economic Assessment of Ex Ante Licensing
Negotiations in Standard Setting, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 445, 455 (2009); see also Melamed & Shapiro, supra note 44, at 2116–17.
112
See supra text accompanying notes 69–70.
113
See, e.g., Brookins v. Int’l Motor Contest Ass’n, 219 F.3d 849, 852–54 (8th
Cir. 2000) (explaining that defendant IMCA was one out of many racing bodies
and its standard lacked power over the general market for oval track automobile
racing); Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, 40 F.3d 247, 250–51 (7th
Cir. 1994) (reasoning that physicians excluded from specialized professional association could still practice their profession without difficulty where membership in
the association was not necessary to practice); Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil
Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 484 (1st Cir. 1988) (association that graded and approved underground plumbing fixtures lacked power when it appeared that few
market participants paid much attention to their recommendations).
114
See Welcome to the Blu-Ray Disc Association, BLU-RAY DISC, http://
www.blu-raydisc.com/en/index.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2020) [https://
perma.cc/8LEB-NJAP].
115
See Sean Hollister, Samsung Quits Making New Blu-ray Players, VERGE
(Feb. 17, 2019, 5:04 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/17/18228584/
samsung-stops-producing-blu-ray-players [https://perma.cc/YY2F-NJDU].
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power question. A patent that is essential to manufacturing an
obsolete product may not be worth all that much.
SEP status is also important to questions about the
breadth of a relevant antitrust market. For example, once a
patent has been designated standard essential, substitute patents that are not essential are typically poor alternatives for
technology operating on that network. This is simply a special
case of the proposition that regulatory requirements or accepted business practices can serve to narrow the scope of
relevant markets, thus giving firms greater power. If compliance with a standard is necessary to doing business in a market, then the market will be limited to complying producers.116
To be sure, a particular patent may have been mis-declared and not be essential at all to practice under a certain
standard.117 But given that declaration is a voluntary act of
the patentee it seems wise at the onset to take the patentee at
its word and presume that a SEP-declared patent is essential
and thus confers significant power. Important evidence that it
is not essential is a finding that the implementers’ technology,
while practicing the standard, does not infringe the patent.
Such a patent may have no more power than the general run of
non-SEP patents.
The market power query considers whether a firm (or cartel) has sufficient power to increase price to supracompetitive
levels without losing so many sales that the increase is unprofitable.118 Any factor that limits substitution, including SEP
status, can result in a narrower market definition. To illus116
E.g., United States v. Phillipsburg Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350,
361–62 (1970) (showing that the local regulatory requirements in effect at the
time served to reduce the size of geographic markets); see also E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 442–43 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting
relevance of regulatory requirements in determining size of geographic antitrust
market); Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1387 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting
that the “certificate of need” requirement served to protect incumbent hospitals
from new competition). For example, the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines call
for narrower markets in cases where some products but not others have regulatory approval. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES § 4.2.2 (2010), https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guide
lines-08192010 [https://perma.cc/HJ8G-FN32]; see also 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 572b (4th ed. 2015) (discussing regulatory
requirements as narrowing markets to as to include the range of products approved by the regulator). Barriers to entry, which enhance market power, also
include regulatory requirements that give an advantage to incumbents. See
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 307 (3d Cir. 2007); Rochester
Drug Co-op., Inc. v. Braintree Labs., 712 F. Supp. 2d 308, 315 (D. Del. 2010).
117
On the phenomenon of over-declaring standard essential patents, see
supra text accompanying notes 31–34.
118
See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 116, ¶ 501.
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trate, absent an industry standard, builders might regard steel
and plastic (PVC) conduit for electric wiring as effective substitutes. However, once a standard with market force approves
only steel conduit, as happened in the Allied Tube case, a sole
producer or cartel of producers of that conduit could have significant power and need not be concerned about competition
from PVC.119
In sum, while violation of a FRAND commitment on a SEP
is not necessarily an antitrust violation, two important antitrust requirements, power and anticompetitive effects, can be
heavily affected by SEP status. Conditionally refusing to license a FRAND-encumbered patent when the relevant agreement requires licensing is clearly a breach of contract, but it
can also be an antitrust violation when these conditions are
met.
Conditional dealing is unlawful under the antitrust laws
only when both power and anticompetitive effects are shown.
Conventionally, the relevant anticompetitive effects are market
foreclosure or raising rivals’ costs. Here, the primary question
is whether the condition made it more costly or impossible for a
participating firm to operate on the network. Under the restraint of trade standard of section 1 of the Sherman Act, antitrust harm also includes reduced output and higher prices in
output markets. Depending on the facts, the victims could be
either excluded rivals; those whose costs have been increased;
or else downstream firms, including consumers, forced to pay
higher prices.
2.

Unconditional Refusals: FRAND Patents and Path
Dependent Technologies

In Aspen, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld a plaintiff’s jury verdict in a case involving an unconditional refusal to
deal.120 Although criticism of Aspen has been widespread,
much of it seems to be driven by a tendency to confuse the
119

Once PVC conduit was approved, it became a market leader. See PERSISMARKET RESEARCH, Global Market Study on Electrical Conduit Pipe: Sales
Remain Influenced by Environmental Concerns Surrounding Plastics, (Sept. 2019)
https://www.persistencemarketresearch.com/market-research/electrical-con
duit-pipe-market.asp [https://perma.cc/B8ZW-KZYH]. However, PVC conduit
had been the target of a standard-setting boycott organized by a cartel of steel
conduit manufacturers. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.,
486 U.S. 492, 496–97 (1988). If the boycott had succeeded it would very likely
have excluded PVC from many building uses.
120
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 611
(1985).
TENCE
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Aspen case with the very different essential facility doctrine.121
The essential facility doctrine is asset based. By contrast,
Aspen’s refusal-to-deal rule is conduct based. Further, the two
rules are informed by very different theories of incentives and
competitive harm.122
Antitrust analysis of unconditional, unilateral refusals to
deal is difficult for several reasons. First, an overly broad rule
can facilitate competitor free riding on a dominant firm’s investment. Smaller rivals might like nothing more than to have
ready access to some input that the dominant firm has developed, thus avoiding the risk and development costs. In that
case, forcing the dominant firm to supply them can reduce
competitors’ incentives to invest for themselves.123 For similar
reasons, sharing of an important input by two firms may facilitate collusion.124 As a result, “essentiality” is a necessary condition for illegality.125 If a competing firm can easily duplicate a
particular input for itself, antitrust law should not require
sharing. A good antitrust rule rewards investment rather than
passivity.
Second, remedial problems can be formidable. In order to
enforce a dealing order, the court must both identify the asset
that is subject to compulsory dealing and determine the price.
By contrast, if the claim is of concerted refusal to deal, the court
may do no more than issue an injunction dissolving the agreement and permitting each firm to act independently.126 Unless
some mechanism is identified for establishing the price and
other terms of sale, these tasks threaten to involve the antitrust
tribunal in a form of price regulation. In Aspen itself, the antitrust litigation originated in a dispute about revenue sharing,
121

See infra text accompanying notes 164–167.
Id.
123
See 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 92, ¶¶ 771–72.
124
See infra text accompanying notes 143–144 (discussing 1975 Colorado
Attorney General complaint of price fixing case against the ski companies in the
Aspen case).
125
See, e.g., Pittsburg Cty. Rural Water Dist. No. 7 v. City of McAlester, 358 F.
3d 694, 721–22 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that a municipal water supply was not
essential when other sources were available); Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v.
ABA, 107 F.3d 1026, 1040–41 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that the plaintiff did not
demonstrate that law school hiring conference was essential when there was no
showing that it could not be duplicated); Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis.
v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1413 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that monopoly
was not proved and HMO not essential when there were existing, viable alternatives). For a discussion of other decisions, see generally 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 81, ¶ 773b.
126
See 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP supra note 81, ¶ 774c, e.

R

122
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which the Supreme Court did not resolve.127 As the Supreme
Court later observed in its Trinko decision, which distinguished
but did not overrule Aspen, the asset that the plaintiff is requesting may be one that was never separately placed on the
market at all, but rather was simply some intermediate good in
a production process.128 That obligates the court to identify the
scope of the good or service for which compulsory dealing is
appropriate. For these reasons antitrust policy toward unilateral refusals to deal has always been conservative.
Because they are unilateral and do not have a contractual
condition attached to them, simple refusals to deal are generally addressed under section 2 of the Sherman Act. The delimiting factors for identifying an anticompetitive unilateral refusal
to deal under the Aspen formulation are (1) a firm that is dominant or that threatens to become so with respect to the market
at issue; (2) a history of cooperative dealing and subsequent
repudiation without an adequate explanation; (3) an asset that
can be separately identified and sold; (4) a mechanism for identifying the scope and terms of the dealing obligation; and (5)
some basis for thinking that relief will make the market perform more competitively.129 An additional requirement should
be that the original cooperative dealing led to significant, assetspecific investment from which extraction or significant modification would be costly.130 This requirement was not shown to
be satisfied in Aspen.
In Trinko the Supreme Court affirmed a dismissal where
most of these requirements were not met. First, there was no
history of voluntary dealing between the ILEC and CLEC telephone exchange carriers.131 To the contrary, the parent phone
127
The jury approved a damage award based on a decline in the plaintiff’s
profits during the years that the parties were disputing the revenue sharing venture. The expert had done this by comparing the plaintiff’s share of revenues
during this period with revenues during the period prior to the dispute. See
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1523 (10th
Cir. 1984).
128
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 409–10 (2004); see infra notes 133–134 and accompanying text.
129
For a discussion of the decisions, see 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note
81, ¶ 772.
130
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITS PRACTICE §§7.5a,c (6th ed. 2020); infra text accompanying notes 154–155.
131
Trinko, 540 U.S., at 408–11. “ILEC,” or Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier, refers to the telephone company established as the primary service provider
for a particular region, and which owns and has responsibility for most of the
infrastructure. By contrast, “CLEC,” or Competitive Local Exchange Carrier, refers to a firm that is authorized under the 1996 Telecommunications Act to attach
into the network at any feasible point in order to provide services in competition
with the ILEC. ILECs are required to:
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company, AT&T, had a long history of resisting attachment to
its network.132 Any cooperation that existed was solely by virtue of the Telecommunications Act, which compelled it under
the supervision of the FCC and state regulatory agencies.133
Second, the dealing obligations contained in the Telecommunications Act were not limited to discrete assets that had
historically been bought and sold in an independent market.
Many of them were “deep within the bowels” of Verizon, as
Justice Antonin Scalia put it.134 The 1996 Telecommunications Act permitted a CLEC to obtain interconnection at “any
technically feasible point” in the incumbent carrier’s net[P]rovide[ ] for the facilities and equipment of any requesting telecommunications carrier, interconnection with the local exchange
carrier’s network—
(A) for the transmission and routing of telephone exchange service
and exchange access;
(B) at any technically feasible point within the carrier’s network;
(C) that is at least equal in quality to that provided by the local
exchange carrier to itself or to any subsidiary, affiliate, or any other
party to which the carrier provides interconnection; and
(D) on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory. . . .
See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2) (2018).
132
See MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1096–97 (7th Cir.
1983) (tracing history of AT&T’s refusal to interconnect); see also Hush-A-Phone
Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (striking down an
extreme case of AT&T refusing to interconnect even to non-electronic anti-listening device); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise, 2004
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 335, 367–369; Joseph H. Weber, The Bell System Divestiture:
Background, Implementation, and Outcome, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 21, 22–27 (2008).
133
See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409. The Court observed:
The refusal to deal alleged in the present case does not fit within the
limited exception recognized in Aspen Skiing. The complaint does
not allege that Verizon voluntarily engaged in a course of dealing
with its rivals, or would ever have done so absent statutory
compulsion.
Id.
134
Id. at 409–10. The Court distinguished Aspen from the case:
In Aspen Skiing, what the defendant refused to provide to its competitor was a product that it already sold at retail—to oversimplify
slightly, lift tickets representing a bundle of services to skiers. . . . In
the present case, by contrast, the services allegedly withheld are not
otherwise marketed or available to the public. The sharing obligation imposed by the 1996 [Telecommunications] Act created “something brand new”—”the wholesale market for leasing network
elements.” The unbundled elements offered pursuant to § 251(c)(3)
exist only deep within the bowels of Verizon; they are brought out on
compulsion of the 1996 Act and offered not to consumers but to
rivals, and at considerable expense and effort. New systems must be
designed and implemented simply to make that access possible—
indeed, it is the failure of one of those systems that prompted the
present complaint.
Id. (citations omitted).
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work.135 It did not matter whether the output at that point had
ever been marketed to any third party. It is one thing to require
dealing with respect to an identifiable asset that can be and
has been sold separately; it is quite another to identify some
intermediate step in a firm’s own production process and require separate dealing at that point. By contrast, FRAND
agreements apply to patents, which are distinct and freely licensable assets. Further, the FRAND agreement itself
manifests a commitment to license them on an unrestricted
basis to a variety of takers.
The fourth and fifth elements in the Aspen formulation
involve determination of the scope of dealing, as well as the
mechanisms for assuring that dealing obligations would further competition. In Trinko these tasks were taken over by
federal (FCC) and state (PSC)136 regulators, who responded to
and disciplined interconnection violations. The Court concluded that these agencies had been doing their job adequately,
performing as “an effective steward of the antitrust function.”137 In fact, at the time of litigation the FCC had already
disciplined the defendant for at least one violation of interconnection obligations.138
The Trinko Court described Aspen as lying “at or near the
outer boundary” of antitrust liability under section 2 of the
Sherman Act.139 On the facts of Aspen, it certainly did stretch
liability for refusal to deal very far. On the one side were significant collusion risks from joint operations; on the other were
relatively modest market harms from the defendant’s unilateral
termination of the deal. The Court cited only the fact that the
joint venture was “presumably profitable” and that the defendant abandoned it without a good explanation.140
135

See supra note 131.
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 402 (referencing the Federal Communications Commission (interstate authority) and the New York Public Service Commission (intrastate authority).
137
Id. at 414.
138
Id. at 413 (noting that FCC had investigated the complaint, imposed a
“substantial fine,” and set up monitoring to assess compliance with a remedy
order).
139
Id. at 409. But Aspen is hardly dead. It was applied robustly by the
Seventh Circuit in Viamedia, Inc. v. Comast Corp. 951 F.3d 429 (7th Cir. 2020).
140
The Court noted that:
Aspen Skiing is at or near the outer boundary of § 2 liability. The
Court there found significance in the defendant’s decision to cease
participation in a cooperative venture. The unilateral termination of
a voluntary (and thus presumably profitable) course of dealing suggested a willingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end.
136
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These facts are important. Occasionally courts and writers
are tripped up into thinking that Trinko’s characterization of
Aspen is some kind of free-floating proclamation about refusalto-deal law generally.141 The Ninth Circuit made that error in
Qualcomm, and in the process conflated the standard developed in the two decisions.142 Nothing in either Aspen nor
Trinko suggests that, and such an approach would be inconsistent with the strongly fact-specific nature of judicial construction of section 2 of the Sherman Act.
Aspen occurred in a poorly defined market143 with significant risks of collusion between the two parties.144 While the
Aspen venture was cooperative and “presumably profitable,”145
the Aspen record did not cite any significant venture-specific
investment by either party in reliance on this commitment to a
joint sales agreement.146 The plaintiff acknowledged that it had
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409 (citations omitted).
141
See, e.g., Tom Campbell & Nirit Sandman, A New Test For Predation:
Targeting, 52 UCLA L. REV. 365, 385–87 (2004) (discussing Trinko and Aspen);
Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75 (2010)
(same); Richard A. Epstein, Judge Koh’s Monopolization Mania: Her Novel Antitrust
Assault Against Qualcomm Is An Abuse of Antitrust Theory, 98 NEB. L. REV. 241,
257–60 (2019) (same); Thomas E. Kauper, Section Two of the Sherman Act: the
Search for Standards, 93 GEO. L.J. 1623, 1636–44 (2005) (same); Randal C.
Picker, Mandatory Access Obligations and Standing, 31 J. CORP. L. 387, 391–92
(2006) (same); Patrick F. Todd, Digital Platforms and the Leverage Problem, 98
NEB. L. REV. 486 (2019) (noting Trinko’s treatment of Aspen). For an observation
of the highly fact specific nature of Aspen, see Gregory J. Werden, The “No Economic Sense” Test for Exclusionary Conduct, 31 J. CORP. L. 293, 295–96 (2006).
142
Qualcomm, Inc. v. FTC, 969 F.3d 974, 993-994 2020 WL 4591476 (9th Cir.
Aug. 11, 2020).
143
Less than ten years after the decision, the government permitted the two
parties to merge, which was clearly inconsistent with the proposition that Aspen,
Colorado, constituted a relevant geographic market. If it had, this would have
been a merger to monopoly. See Ski Merger May Perk Up Aspen, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
20, 1993, at 37, 44. The market in question was for “destination” ski resorts, as
the jury found, but it was also permitted to find a relevant submarket for downhill
skiing in the Aspen area. See Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co.,
738 F.2d 1509, 1513 (10th Cir. 1984). A “destination” ski resort is one that people
travel to from long distances, and this suggested that a large group of Rocky
Mountain resorts as well as skiing facilities elsewhere were in the geographic
market. The defendant complained that there could not be both a relevant market
and a relevant submarket, but the Tenth Circuit agreed with the plaintiff that this
argument had been waived. On the general irrelevance of “submarkets,” see 2B
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 116, ¶ 533.
144
See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 591
n.9 (1985) (noting that the Colorado Attorney General had filed a complaint that
the collaboration on tickets facilitated price fixing). It was settled by a consent
decree that permitted the venture to continue but with conditions.
145
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
146
In particular, they made only a very modest investment in ski lifts. See
Brief for Petitioner at 28 n.31, Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 585 (No. 84-510), 1985
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produced no innovations in furtherance of the venture.147
Nothing suggested that termination of the Aspen venture did
much more than return the market to its status quo ante.
A great deal has been made of the Court’s observation that
the jury was entitled to find that the defendant was willing to
sacrifice short-term revenues in order to injure a rival.148 However, the record indicates that sacrifice did not occur at all or
was very minimal.149 The four-mountain ticket sold by the
joint venture claimed a higher price, but the defendant had to
share the revenue with the plaintiff.150 Further, the record
indicated that, immediately after the termination, skier visits to
the defendant’s resort increased rather than decreased, and
there was no suggestion of either reduced revenue or reduced
profits.151 To be sure, that piece of evidence is not necessarily
conclusive on the sacrifice issue. For example, the defendant’s
revenue or profits might have increased even faster had the
venture not been terminated, although it is not apparent that is
what the Court meant. But neither the Supreme Court nor the
Tenth Circuit cited any evidence of sacrifice other than the
Court’s bare statement.152 The Tenth Circuit did not discuss
sacrifice at all, nor the revenue impact of the termination on
the defendant. It did observe, however, that the plaintiff’s revenue declined when the venture came to an end.153
In sharp contrast to the Aspen situation, standard setting
covering patented technology in a many firm market poses
fewer collusion risks and can be expected to produce significantly greater investment in the form of asset-specific commitment to new technologies. Collusion risks are less because
these markets typically have hundreds of firms whose relationWL 669987 (citing a witness who thought its last lift was added in 1975 or 1976)
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
147
See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3, Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 585 (No.
84–510), 1985 WL 669989 [hereinafter Reply Brief for Petitioner].
148
Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 610–11. For articles discussing the decision, see
Nicholas Economides, Hit and Miss: Leverage, Sacrifice, and Refusal to Deal in the
Supreme Court Decision in Trinko, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 121 (2007); Kauper,
supra note 141, at 1623; Marina Lao, Aspen Skiing and Trinko: Antitrust Intent
and “Sacrifice,” 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 171 (2005); Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-sacrifice Standard, 73 ANTITRUST
L.J. 311 (2006).
149
See, e.g., Reply Brief for Petitioner supra note 147, at 10 (describing the
record).
150
See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 146, at 10.
151
See id.
152
See generally Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d
1509 (10th Cir. 1984) (citing no evidence).
153
Id. at 1523.
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ship with one another is both horizontal and vertical as well as
complementary.154 Further, some are producer licensors while
others are licensees.155 In addition, the FRAND system encourages rather than discourages new entry by eliminating
much of the patent portfolio as a significant entry barrier.
Finally, the FRAND encumbered patents subject to sharing
make up only a small portion of the final products. FRAND
does not require every firm to share every iota of its technology
with everyone else, but only licenses to standard-essential patents. Competition can and does work unabated in other parts
of the market. The result has produced fierce competition and
remarkable amounts of technological progress. For example,
while the cell phone industry is heavily covered by FRAND
agreements, sellers compete vigorously in both the provision of
cellular networks156 and the manufacture and sale of devices.157 Some of the features subject to competition are in the
public domain, either because they were never patented or
their patents have expired. Other features are protected by
non-FRAND patents. Finally, individual participants’ products
tend to be highly differentiated, which makes collusion less of a
threat.158
On the benefit side, the joint venture benefits that accrued
to the firms in Aspen were economies of scale from being able to
154
For example, JEDEC, a prominent developer of standards for microelectronics, has 300 member companies. See About JEDEC, JEDEC, https://
www.jedec.org/about-jedec [https://perma.cc/ACT6-DZ4B] (last visited Apr. 6,
2020).
155
For example, 3GPP, the principal standard setting partnership involved in
the Qualcomm litigation, has more than 350 members ranging from very small
firms to firms such as Apple, Google, Intel, Microsoft, and Nokia. See 3GPP Membership, ETSI, https://webapp.etsi.org/3gppmembership/QueryForm.asp
[https://perma.cc/2XZ6-GZV5] (last visited Apr. 6, 2020).
156
On cell phone carrier market share prior to the Sprint/T-Mobile merger,
see STATISTA, Wireless Subscriptions Market Share by Carrier in the U.S. from 1st
Quarter 2011 to 3rd Quarter 2019, (Dec. 2019) https://www.statista.com/statis
tics/199359/market-share-of-wireless-carriers-in-the-us-by-subscriptions/
[https://perma.cc/3P8X-D5WJ] (date through Q3 of 2019).
157
On the market shares of the leading cellphone device manufacturers in the
United States, see Team Counterpoint, U.S. Smartphone Market Share: By Quarter, COUNTERPOINT (May 17, 2020) https://www.counterpointresearch.com/usmarket-smartphone-share/ [https://perma.cc/238U-9VGY] (data through Q1 of
2020); see also Matt Macari, FRANDs Forever: How the Smartphone Industry
Turned a Gentlemen’s Agreement into a Full-Scale Patent War, VERGE (Feb. 16,
2012, 4:01 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2012/2/16/2786970/FRANDsmartphone-industry-apple-motorola-samsung [https://perma.cc/962L-3FFJ]
(analyzing the relationship between FRAND and the cell phone industry).
158
On product differentiation and collusion risks, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 4.4 (6th ed.
2020).
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market all of the parties’ mountains together.159 The network
benefits that can accrue from multi-firm standard setting in a
market requiring interoperability are much more substantial.160 Depending on the extent and depth of path dependent
investment, loss of access could result in higher prices or deficient service, both of which are within the boundaries of the
Sherman Act’s remedial concerns.161 While the Antitrust Law
treatise generally defends a restrictive approach to unilateral
duties to deal,162 it has recognized an exception for refusals in
networked industries in which coordination is required and a
firm has significant market power:
Liability can make sense in network industries where the
network has evolved with multifirm participation and cooperation is necessary for the network’s continued efficient operation. The case for compelled dealing is stronger if the
network developed in a cooperative regime and a dealing order serves mainly to preserve a preexisting practice rather
than create a new one.163

The Aspen Court made clear that it was not applying the
essential facility doctrine.164 While the two rationales for compelling dealing under the antitrust laws are sometimes conflated, they rest on very different grounds. The essential facility
doctrine is much more difficult to justify outside of the regulatory context. It is based on the idea that some “facilities,” or
assets, are so essential in and of themselves that the owner has
a duty to share them.165 Recipients need do no more than
request access. By contrast, Aspen encourages individual
firms to invest in a joint enterprise, confident that they will
have access to the necessary technology.166
159
Aspen Highlands Skiing corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509,
1522–23 (10th Cir. 1984).
160
See, e.g., Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 547 F.3d 266, 273
(5th Cir. 2008) (listing economies of scale from earlier cellular standard, 3G, as
including economies of scale, reducing consumer search costs, promoting technical compatibility); see also Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68
ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 926 (2001) (networks achieve economies of scale through
interfirm cooperation). For an important foundational piece, see John C. Panzar
& Robert D. Willig, Economies of Scale in Multi-Output Production, 91 Q.J. Econ.
481 (1977); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Costs of Movement, 78
ANTITRUST L.J. 67, 85–86 (2012) (discussing the benefit of networks).
161
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
162
See 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 81, ¶ 771.
163
Id. ¶ 772.
164
See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 611
n.44 (1985).
165
See, e.g., Marina Lao, Search, Essential Facilities, and the Antitrust Duty to
Deal, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 275, 287 (2013).
166
See Aspen, 472 U.S. at 600–01.
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While the essential facility doctrine is conducive to competitor passivity, the Aspen rule does precisely the opposite: it
serves to protect and thereby encourage reasonable investment, particularly in technologies that are specialized, individually costly to develop, and where compatibility or
interconnectivity among multiple firms is necessary. The idea
that a facility is “essential” indicates that rivals are unable and
need not bother to develop their own alternatives. Instead,
they should seek a right to connect into the dominant firm’s
facility. By contrast, the Aspen rule is based on a premise of
initial voluntary commitment to invest jointly. If one firm later
repudiates that commitment in a way that threatens to undermine it, those investment backed expectations are lost.
For this reason, a recent Antitrust Division brief suggesting
that the Aspen rule applies only where the original arrangement between the parties is noncontractual seems precisely
wrong.167 While an enforceable contract may not be essential,
there must be enough of a commitment and expectation of
cooperation to guide the parties’ future investment decisions.
That is, the more certain and enforceable the initial agreement
among the parties, and the more calculated to induce path
dependence, the more the defendant’s subsequent repudiation
is likely to upset settled expectations and harm consumers in
the process.
As noted previously, Aspen is widely cited for the proposition that some kind of “sacrifice” is essential to liability.168 The
record indicates that no such sacrifice had occurred, but only
that the joint venture had apparently been profitable and its
termination led to the plaintiff’s decline.169 Whether or not the
Court was mistaken about the facts, however, it did make “sacrifice” relevant to a consideration of liability.170 One problem
with this sacrifice test is that it fails to distinguish ordinary
167
See United States’ Statement of Interest Concerning Qualcomm’s Motion
for Partial Stay of Injunction Pending Appeal at 5–6, FTC v. Qualcomm FTC v.
Qualcomm, 411 F. Supp. 3d 658 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 19-16122), 2019 WL
3306496, https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/1183936/ [https://
perma.cc/TD48-2W9P]. In its 2020 Viamedia decision, the Seventh Circuit also
based its Aspen holding on initial voluntary interconnection agreements, which
Comcast later repudiated. See Viamedia, Inc. v. Comast Corp., 951 F.3d 429, 479
(7th Cir. 2020).
168
See supra note 148.
169
See Aspen, 472 U.S. at 608; id. at 610–11 (jury entitled to conclude that
the defendant “was willing to sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer goodwill
in exchange for a perceived long-run impact on its smaller rival”); supra text
accompanying notes 144.
170
Aspen, 472 U.S. at 608–10.
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investment that involve costs up front and payoffs later.171 A
firm that builds a new plant makes a “sacrifice” to the extent
that costs come first, and gains only after the plant goes into
production. If it also knows that the firm’s increase in output
will injure a rival—as any significant output increase in a concentrated market is likely to do—does that mean we should
condemn it as exclusionary? After all, in a duopoly market
such as Aspen, Colorado, one firm’s investment and output
gain would necessarily come at the expense of its rival. In
short, “sacrifice” adds nothing to our understanding of the
competitive harm arising from Aspen-style situations and may
be misleading. Any view of investment other than the very
short-run involves some element of sacrifice.
In any event, whether or not Aspen requires some conception of “sacrifice,” the facts of Qualcomm met it.172 By refusing
to license to competitors, Qualcomm gave up short-term licensing revenue from these firms, and this sacrifice was profitable
only to the extent that it served to injure or exclude these
competitors.173 Very largely the same thing can be said of its
exclusive dealing and loyalty discount campaigns involving
firms such as Apple.174 It paid Apple significant rebates or
accepted reduced returns in exchange for a promise not to deal
with Qualcomm’s product market competitors; the profitability
of these payments depended on their eventual success in suppressing the output of rivals.175
The essential facility doctrine is different, and the Trinko
case was more consistent with its principles.176 The Telecommunications Act at issue in Trinko permitted competitive exchange carriers to interconnect with the dominant firm’s
facility no matter how small their investment in infrastructure.177 This was also true of the Otter Tail Power case thirty
years earlier, which interpreted antitrust law to require the
defendant to “wheel” power for small utilities, whether or not
they had developed their own generation capacity.178 In contrast to Trinko, the Court found antitrust liability in Otter Tail.
171
See Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1079–80 (10th Cir.
2013) (Gorsuch, Circuit J.) (wrestling with this ambiguity).
172
FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658 (N. D. Cal. 2019).
173
Id. at 761–62.
174
Id. at 762–64.
175
Id.
176
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398 (2004).
177
See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 385–86 (1999) (giving
FCC broad authority over interconnection between ILECs and even small CLECs).
178
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 380–81 (1973).
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The important difference was that, in the former case, the then
existing Federal Power Commission lacked the authority to
compel wheeling of power in behalf of competing utilities.179
Wheeling power for utilities that lacked their own generation
capacity was a close equivalent to interconnection in the phone
system. By contrast, in Trinko the relevant government agencies not only had the power to compel interconnection, the FCC
had actually exercised that power in this very case.180
Aspen, in contrast to essential facility cases, was rooted in
specific prior cooperation and investment by the plaintiff, reliance and path dependence, and subsequent repudiation. The
Court held essentially that once the defendant had made a
commitment to its rival to develop a joint enterprise, it could
not abandon that enterprise without an adequate business justification in those situations where the change injured
competition.181
Not only is the Aspen approach to unilateral dealing obligations easier to justify as an abstract proposition, it also contains inherent limitations that make it more manageable by an
antitrust tribunal. Because there is no prior history of voluntary dealing, the essential facility doctrine naturally invites
questions about the scope of the property right that must be
shared and the identification of those to whom the sharing
obligation runs. These are both issues that are much better
addressed by a regulatory agency applying an appropriate statute.182 By contrast, the Aspen duty to deal involves a specific
voluntary commitment between specific parties, covering stipulated assets, and under stipulated terms that can be expected
to produce reliance that affects the direction of investment.183
Joint enterprises such as FRAND produce path dependence when they redirect the parties’ investments in ways that
are subsequently costly to change.184 As in all cases of profit179
See id. at 375–76. Subsequent statutory amendments authorized FERC,
the FPC’s successor agency, to compel wheeling. See 16 U.S.C. §824a-3 (2018);
Nicholas W. Fels & David N. Heap, Compulsory Wheeling of Electric Power to
Industrial Consumers, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 219, 226 (1983).
180
See supra text accompanying notes 157–58.
181
See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608
(1985) (“[S]trongly supported by Ski Co.’s failure to offer any efficiency justification whatever for its pattern of conduct.”).
182
See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398, 410–11 (2004).
183
See Aspen, 472 U.S. at 605–11.
184
For some of the large literature on the subject, see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING
2 (1985); Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J.
ECON. 426, 439–41 (1976); Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable
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maximizing behavior, the value of the firm becomes a function
of its prior choices.185 This is also true of networks, where the
ability to operate on the network is often essential to a firm’s
survival.
In Aspen, the Supreme Court required that the dominant
firm’s subsequent withdraw from its contractual commitment
be without an adequate business justification.186 Not every
joint enterprise is successful, and the law should not require a
firm to continue in a venture that is no longer economically
justified. At the same time, however, when one party is undermining another party’s investments in a way that is conducive
to reduced output and higher prices, antitrust intervention is
appropriate.
One thing that makes FRAND obligations distinctive is that
the contractual obligation to deal applies strictly to patents.
Licensing out a patent does not require any further ongoing
commitment from the patentee. Further, the patent itself is
non-rivalrous, which means that the licensee’s use does not
take any productive capacity away from the licensor or require
any of its administrative effort. FRAND licenses are by their
nature non-exclusive.187 Giving up a FRAND license imposes
no limitations whatsoever on the power of the patentee to take
full advantage of its own production assets and use them
exclusively.
This fact makes patent cross-licensing very distinctive
from more traditional production joint ventures, which usually
involve rivalrous plants, production, or research facilities with
a finite capacity that must be shared. For example, if
Qualcomm licenses its 5G portfolio of standard essential
modem patents to one or many competing makers of 5G
modems under a FRAND license, Qualcomm can go right on
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 298 (1978).
On the antitrust issues, see Hovenkamp, supra note 109 at §7.5c.
185
See Cotter, Hovenkamp & Siebrasse, supra note 25, at 1521–22. On the
relationship between path dependence and firm value, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk
& Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 137 (1999).
186
Aspen, 472 U.S. at 608–10 (reciting the defendant’s proffered justifications
and why the Court found them unacceptable).
187
See David J. Teece, The “Tragedy of the Anticommons” Fallacy: A Law and
Economics Analysis of Patent Thickets and FRAND Licensing, 32 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1489, 1522 (2017). EU Guidelines require that all FRAND licenses be nonexclusive if the pool in question has market power. Commission, Guidelines on
the Application of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union to Technology Transfer Agreements ¶ 261(d), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014XC0328(01)&from=en [https://
perma.cc/3CH6-RFRP].
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producing as many 5G modems as it wishes. By contrast, even
in a very simple joint venture such as the one in Aspen, continuing the joint venture requires the firms to share certain parts
of their own production and output and continuously manage
how shared assets are used.188
Antitrust intervention also requires evidence that the refusal to continue an agreed upon course of conduct harms
competition, and that intervention will make the market perform more competitively.189 One reason this might not be so is
that the market is competitive in any event. This is often true
in bilateral monopoly situations in competitive markets. For
example, two farmers might jointly develop an irrigation pond
at great expense, and one might later withdraw, perhaps without a business justification, leaving the other in financial distress. The market remains competitive, however, even if the
breakup ruins one of the two farmers. While the withdrawal
might be a breach of contract or a tort, it would not violate the
antitrust laws.
Another possibility is that the joint venture was simply an
excuse for price fixing. For example, if the all-Aspen joint lift
ticket was simply a way of setting the cartel price for downhill
skiing in Aspen, then a breakup could well make the market
perform better.190 The dangers of collusion in the Aspen case
were certainly greater than the dangers of collusion in a FRAND
case involving a large number of participants and differentiated
output.191 As the Allied Tube case suggests, however, collusion
among standard setters cannot entirely be ruled out.192 In that
case members of a large SSO with a substantial investment in
manufacturing steel conduit collusively passed a rule outlawing PVC conduit, which threatened to be a major market
disrupter.193
A FRAND obligation indicates that the patentee has made a
prior voluntary commitment to share its technology on FRAND
terms. In exchange it expects that others would rely on that
commitment, designing their own technology around the expectation that FRAND-encumbered patents would be available
to them for a FRAND royalty. The market shapes itself around
188

Aspen, 472 U.S. at 608.
See supra text accompanying notes 53–54.
190
See Aspen, 472 U.S. at 591 n.9; supra note 124 (noting the government
investigation into price-fixing).
191
See discussion supra text accompanying note 151.
192
Allied Tube& Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 496–97
(1988).
193
See id. at 496–97.
189
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the technologies contemplated by SEPs. Indeed, that is the
entire point of the SSO, and also serves to explain why a firm’s
later, unjustified withdrawal can harm competition.
The Aspen case assumed some of this.194 Once the parties
agreed on a joint marketing scheme, they almost certainly adjusted their advertising and other promotional efforts around
that scheme. One fact that places Aspen near the outer boundaries of antitrust liability, however, is that the Court permitted
the jury to find a violation even though the amount of dedicated
investment that the plaintiff lost was modest.195 Mainly, the
two firms had agreed with each other to market an “All-Aspen”
lift ticket jointly.196 They apparently did not redirect significant
investment into infrastructure that would have been useless
had the venture collapsed.
Aspen limited its reach to situations where the defendant
had voluntarily cooperated with a rival and later reneged without an adequate explanation. In her Qualcomm decision,
Judge Koh described a similar situation.197 Qualcomm or its
predecessors voluntarily made FRAND commitments on its
patents and then reneged on those commitments.198 Aspen’s
limitation to repudiation of established arrangements speaks
to the role of technological path dependence in the creation or
maintenance of dominance.199 By giving a particular technological choice more predictable costs, FRAND encourages developers to invest in a particular direction.
Whatever one might think of the essential facility doctrine
as a tool of antitrust rather than regulatory policy, the contrasting Aspen doctrine rests on distinct and solid grounds in
situations that involve reliance and significant joint investment. Joint ventures enable firms to combine complementary
technologies or business models and thus facilitate growth.
This has been true of some very prominent ventures that involved production or research facilities, such as the General
Motors-Toyota venture to design and produce a single small
car,200 the joint venture between Kodak and General Electric to
194

Aspen, 472 U.S. at 591.
Id. at 586.
196
See id. at 606.
197
FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 669–80 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
198
Id. at 760 (“Qualcomm Terminated a Voluntary and Profitable Course of
Dealing”).
199
On this point, see Cotter, Hovenkamp & Siebrasse, supra note 25.
200
See In re General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. 58, 1 (1984). On competitive
effects, see Kathryn M. Fenton, GM/Toyota: Twenty Years Later, 72 ANTITRUST L.J.
1013, 1013–21 (2005).
195
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develop an electronic flash device for cameras,201 or the venture between Sony and N.V. Philips to develop technology for
rewritable compact discs.202
The E.U. Microsoft server decision also illustrates some of
these propositions.203 That decision indicates the importance
of path dependence in the maintenance of monopoly power,
particularly in areas where technical compatibility is critical to
the enterprise. Initially, Microsoft made its Windows operating
system for desktop and laptop computers with active operators. It did not develop an operating system for servers, which
are computers that are largely untended and that perform routine functions such as managing email or web traffic. Other
firms, including Novell, developed operating systems for servers that were designed to operate on the networks of Windows
machines. For these, Microsoft provided protocols essential to
keeping these firms abreast of updates in the Windows operating system. Later, however, Microsoft entered the server operating system business itself in competition with these
licensees. At that point it began to degrade or delay the information that it provided to the competing sellers of server systems.204 The effect was to make these competing systems less
reliable. As a remedy, the EU tribunal required Microsoft to
provide updated and adequate protocols.205 Liability, as in
Aspen, lay in a course of conduct, not in any finding that the
Microsoft operating system was an essential facility.206
A compulsory dealing order is justified only if it creates a
reasonable expectation that the market will become more competitive—that is, that output will be higher, and prices lower,
than if relief were not provided. One common criticism of the
“essential facility” doctrine, which Aspen did not involve, is that
if a tribunal simply orders a dominant firm to share an asset
201
See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F. Supp. 404, 419
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 603 F.2d 263, 267–71 (2d Cir.
1979).
202
See Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1322–23 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (en banc).
203
Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, http://
curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?docid=62940&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&
mode=&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=9183931 [https://perma.cc/9HWL-5NHE];
see Herbert Hovenkamp, supra note 160, at 86–87.
204
See Microsoft Corp., 2007 E.R.C. II-3601 ¶ 575.
205
Id. ¶ 1231 (“Microsoft is . . . required to ensure that the interoperability
information disclosed is kept updated on an ongoing basis and in a timely
manner”).
206
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 600
(1985).
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the firm is likely to respond by setting its monopoly price.207 As
a result, output will not increase under dealing. The dealing
order may benefit the rival who can now purchase the input,
but customers will be no better off. Real relief that increases
competition requires both recognition of a duty to deal and
setting of the terms of dealing.
In situations involving standard essential patents, these
problems are largely addressed by the FRAND commitment itself, which includes a promise to submit the royalty question to
an independent decision maker.208 The antitrust tribunal may
also issue an injunction interpreting the scope of the FRAND
commitment, requiring arbitration with respect to every potential licensee who is covered. To the extent that the challenged
violation results in less participation, lower production or
higher prices than a FRAND tribunal would have permitted,
antitrust relief should bring output and price into line.
Antitrust dealing orders are well suited to remedy one of
the practices at issue in the Qualcomm case—namely, that the
defendant selectively refused to deal with or discriminated
against prospective FRAND-qualified licensees depending on
whether they competed with Qualcomm in the product market.209 The FRAND violation is clear without further market
analysis to the extent that the FRAND obligation demands nondiscriminatory licensing to all parties practicing on the
standard.210
A refusal to deal with competitors additionally violates the
antitrust rule of reason only if it produces anticompetitive effects. Once again, that presents a fact question, and not every
refusal to license in violation of a FRAND commitment will be
an antitrust violation. An antitrust violation would occur if, for
example, the defendant’s selective denial of standard essential
patents to market rivals serves to impede their growth, raises
their costs, or perhaps exclude them from the market altogether. All of these concerns are conventional in the antitrust
law of exclusive dealing and quasi-exclusive dealing.211 Indeed, evading a FRAND requirement by licensing selectively
only to noncompetitors threatens to undermine the entire competitive purpose of the joint venture. The purpose of standard
207

See 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 81, ¶¶ 773c., 774b.
See supra text accompanying note 23.
209
See FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 762–72 (N.D. Cal. 2019)
(discussing Qualcomm’s exclusive dealing).
210
See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 876–77 (9th Cir.
2012).
211
See 11 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 81, ¶1821.
208
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setting is to design a standard so that goods can be produced
competitively within a shared technology.
The Ninth Circuit’s odd and unprecedented approach to
refusal to deal stood the traditional critique of Aspen on its
head. One frequent criticism of antitrust refusal to deal doctrine is that the all-important element of consumer harm is
missing. A dealing order without price setting simply preserves
the monopoly price and output. In sharp contrast, the Ninth
Circuit dismissed the refusal to deal claim because there was
insufficient evidence of harm to competitors, although it conceded that there was harm to purchasers. It concluded that
harms to purchasers “are not ‘anticompetitive’ in the antitrust
sense,” because they do not involve “restraints on trade or exclusionary conduct in the area of effective competition.”212
What the court meant by his later statement is that the
consumers were not in the same market as the defendant and
its rivals.213 True enough, the consumers were not competing
chip makers, but the entire purpose of the antitrust enterprise
is their protection. Typically, purchasers are not producers in
the same relevant market as sellers. That is why they are
purchasing.
Antitrust also has a role to play in the case of tying or
similar practices. To the extent the owner of a FRAND-encumbered patent licenses only on the condition that the implementer also purchases its hardware or other products or
services, the firm undoubtedly is in breach of its FRAND commitments. Whether it also commits an antitrust violation depends on power and competitive effects. As noted
previously,214 tying a product to a FRAND-encumbered patent
can be a way of FRAND royalty avoidance: the seller simply
obtains an effectively higher price for the patent by attaching
the increment to the product. Tying in order to evade a controlled price harms consumers by “extraction” rather than exclusion. As such it would be reachable under section 1 of the
Sherman Act if it results in higher prices. A Sherman Act section 2 violation would require a showing of market exclusion,
212
Qualcomm, Inc. v. FTC, 969 F.3d 974, 992 2020 WL 4591476 (9th Cir.
Aug. 11, 2020).
213
The court borrowed the “area of effective competition” language from the
Supreme Court’s statement, where it was used to describe the boundaries of the
relevant market. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285 (2018) (“the
relevant market is defined as ‘the area of effective competition,’” quoting Walker
Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965)).
214
See supra text accompanying notes 147–66.
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most generally in the market occupied by tied product rivals.215
Depending on the circumstances the same tie might accomplish that as well.
B.

Collateral Issues Affecting Application of the Antitrust
Laws

1.

“Regulatory” Deference? Government Regulation vs.
Contract

One common theme in antitrust cases involving regulated
industries is that the role of the antitrust laws must be fashioned so as not to interfere excessively with the regulatory regime.216 The doctrine of “implied immunity” accounts for one
way that the courts have given effect to that concern.217 In
Trinko, the Court concluded that immunity did not apply because the 1996 Telecommunications Act contained an antitrust “saving” clause that preserved antitrust liability for
disputes that were also covered by the Telecommunications
Act.218 Nevertheless, the Court declined to find liability, reasoning essentially that the regulatory agencies were performing
the antitrust function.219
Saving Clause issues aside, implied immunity is a narrowly construed doctrine that serves to immunize conduct
where a regulatory agency has jurisdiction over it and has been
actively involved in regulating it.220 Because federal agencies
are staffed by professional government employees, their control
is public. The antitrust “state action” doctrine operates to create an analogous immunity for conduct that has been regulated by state law, immunizing private acts only when they are
clearly authorized by state law221 and actively supervised by
the state itself.222 As a result, private market participants cannot be the final word in supervision.223
215

See 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 45, ¶¶ 1728–29.
See 1A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 243–45
(4th ed. 2015).
217
See id. ¶ 243d, e.
218
See 47 U.S.C. § 152(b)(1) (2018) (“[N]othing in this Act . . . shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the applicability of any of the antitrust
laws.”); Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 406–7 (2004).
219
See supra text accompanying note 162.
220
1A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 216, ¶ 243e.
221
Id. ¶¶ 224, 225.
222
Id. ¶¶ 226, 227.
223
See, e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 457 U.S. 494, 514–15
(2015).

R

216
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FRAND is not a government regulatory regime at all, but a
set of private rules created and supervised by a joint venture of
interested market participants. Should a set of purely private
rules serve to immunize conduct that is addressed under the
antitrust laws but that may also be a violation of private rule
making? Of course, there could be issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel of previously determined facts in a situation involving both a FRAND contract dispute and an antitrust
dispute. For example, a finding in a FRAND case that the licensing agreement was not violated, or that a patent in question was invalid, could be preclusive of some facts in
subsequent litigation involving the same party, whether under
the antitrust laws or some other body of law.224 Aside from
that, no principle calls for antitrust deference to a private contractual regime.
One possible objection to finding an antitrust violation
when the defendant’s conduct has also violated its FRAND obligation is that this threatens a form of double liability, once for
breach of the agreement and a second time for the antitrust
violation. There is no basis for this concern. Many federal
antitrust violations are also breaches of contract, torts, or violations of some other body of law, including state antitrust law.
The remedy in these cases is not to dismiss one or the other
claim at the onset, but rather to avoid double counting of damages for the same harm once liability for both has been determined. For example, if conduct is found to be both a violation
of a federal statute and of a state common law contract rule,
the damages remedy will include all elements available under
each provision, but those that are duplicated must be remitted
so that a plaintiff can collect only once for the same injury.225
224
See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313,
339 (1971); Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps South, LLC, 735 F.3d 1333, 1342–44
(Fed. Cir 2013).
225
See, e.g., Martinez v. The Port Authority of N.Y. and N.J., 445 F.3d 158,
159–61 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that to the extent claims of malicious prosecution
and false arrest produced the same injury lower court was correct not to permit
recovery for both); Weathers v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 793 F. Supp. 1002,
1028–29 (D. Kan. 1992) (holding that a plaintiff who brings claim on two different
tort theory is entitled to only single compensatory damages); Mailman’s Steam
Carpet Cleaning Corp. v. Lizotte, 616 N.E.2d 85, 89(Mass. 1993) (holding that a
plaintiff who prevailed under both theories of breach of warranty and misrepresentation could only have a single recovery for its injury); Martin v. Jones, 41
N.E.3d 123, 142–43 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) (holding that while plaintiff prevailed on
both a breach of contract theory and a tort theory for the same injury, he would be
permitted to recover only the amount of his actual injury); see also Clayton Brokerage Co. of St. Louis, Inc. v. Pilla, 632 S.W.2d 300, 306 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)
(holding that where plaintiff prevailed on both a fraud claim and a breach of
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As a result, one cannot avoid an antitrust claim by showing
that the conduct in question is also a breach of contract.226
One obvious difference between contract and antitrust
damages is that the antitrust violation permits recovery of
treble damages plus attorney fees, while breach of the FRAND
agreement does not.227 In that case, the appropriate outcome
would be to award antitrust treble damages, but not an additional monetary award for breach of the FRAND obligation to
the extent that it was based on the same injury.
Injunctions generally do not present a problem of duplicative recovery as long as the scope of the injunction is the same
for both causes of action. If a particular injury results from
both breach of a FRAND agreement and an antitrust violation,
the likely remedy is an injunction under either or both provisions for harm that is threatened to recur, and a single set of
damages for any past losses.
2.

Holding Up vs. Holding Out: Antitrust Liability? And
for Whom?

The familiar holdup story in patenting is that a patentee
can strategically time its infringement suit in order to maximize
the penalty it can extract from an infringer.228 For example, if
an infringer has made a $100,000,000 largely irreversible commitment to a particular technology it will be willing to pay any
anything up to that amount in order to obtain an essential
license.229 The impact of the holdup literature has been significontract claim and recovered precisely the same amount of damages for each of
the two claims, the award effectively gave the plaintiff impermissible double
damages).
226
See, e.g., Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 218 (9th
Cir. 1992) (where both antitrust claims and common law tort and contract claims
were predicated on the same loss of future profits, plaintiff must be limited to a
single recovery and that “[t]hus the district court may appropriately award a
single compensatory damage figure, which might, upon retrial represent the jury
award arising from the breach of contract claim, compensatory tort damages, or
the antitrust damages prior to trebling”).
227
Neil W. Hamilton & Virginia B. Cone, Mitigation of Antitrust Damages, 66
OR. L. REV. 339, 347–48 (1987).
228
See Cotter, Hovenkamp & Siebrasse, supra note 25, at 1505–06.
229
In Broadcom, the Third Circuit observed:
[A standard-setting organization] may complete its lengthy process
of evaluating technologies and adopting a new standard, only to
discover that certain technologies essential to implementing the
standard are patented. When this occurs, the patent holder is in a
position to “hold up” industry participants from implementing the
standard. Industry participants who have invested significant resources developing products and technologies that conform to the
standard will find it prohibitively expensive to abandon their investment and switch to another standard. They will have become
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cant and it undoubtedly influenced such decisions as eBay,
Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC,230 which took away the more-orless automatic right to an injunction for patent infringement.
The twin requirements of the SEP process can be viewed as
addressing holdup by, first, requiring participants to provide
timely notice of any IP rights that they plan to assert; and
second, committing in advance to license their rights on a
FRAND basis.
An alternative account of the process is that what is really
occurring is “holding out” by standard implementers at the
expense of inventors. In this account the implementers understand that only one among alternative technologies will be chosen, and they agree either to exclude a particular technology
altogether, or else conditionally approve a particular technology in exchange for a below market royalty or some other costly
concession.231
Currently there is very little empirical support for the holding out explanation for standard essential patents and a great
deal of evidence against it. The holding out theory also contains important analytic and economic flaws.232 In the holdout
scenario a cartel of purchasers refuses to buy from the owner of
a SEP unless the owner reduces its price to meet their terms.
This suggests a bargaining symmetry that can apply to ordinary products in competitive markets: As buyer, I can refuse to
pay the asking price for your cow and go elsewhere. As seller,
you can make a better offer but you cannot do much more than
that, because I have no legal obligation to buy your cow and I
am not stealing it. But that symmetry generally does not apply
to patents. The buyer does not have the option of walking away
if its refusal would constitute patent infringement.233 The SSO
can declare all the alternative standards that it wants, but if
any manufacturer’s device ends up practicing the patent, infringement liability can follow. Further, the SEP patentee, just
“locked in” to the standard. In this unique position of bargaining
power, the patent holder may be able to extract supracompetitive
royalties from the industry participants.
See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 300310 (3d Cir.
2007)
230
547 U.S. 388, 392–94 (2006).
231
See Cotter, Hovenkamp & Siebrasse, supra note 25, at 1548–53.
232
For a good exploration of the issues, see Brief of Amicus Curiae Timothy J.
Muris in Support of Appellee at 20–21, FTC v Qualcomm Inc., (9th Cir. Nov. 29,
2019) (No. 19–16122), 2019 WL 6683006.
233
See Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65
MINN. L. REV. 521, 539–41, 557 (1981).
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as any other, is entitled under the Seventh Amendment to a
jury determination of royalties.234
The holdout story is also undermined by the fact that in the
FRAND scheme a royalty has not yet been determined when the
FRAND commitment is made. Further, when the royalty is
determined it is generally by a neutral third party such as a
federal court or arbitrator, and in an adversarial proceeding.235
This leaves little basis for thinking that implementers are concertedly boycotting innovators in order to reduce their royalties
to below market values. The holding out theory would additionally require some basis for thinking that existing FRAND
royalty tribunals systematically undercompensate the owners
of SEPS. The evidence strongly suggests the contrary. For example, one consequence of overclaiming, discussed previously,
is that pools of SEPS are too large because they include many
patents that are not essential at all.236 To the extent this is so
the pool will be diluted and the royalty on individual patents
will be too low. This is particularly likely when the courts
adopts a “top down” approach that assesses royalties by beginning with an aggregation of all of the patents in the pool and
then divides up royalties accordingly.237 However, federal
tribunals will then adjust the pool in order to reflect exclusion
of patents that are not in fact essential.238
In addition, large consortia such as those that manage
standard setting for the cell phone industry have a diverse
membership that includes patentees, non-patentee manufacturers, research firms, software companies that appear mainly
as licensees, and the like. While some firms might profit from
collusion to suppress patent prices, others clearly would not.
The very diversity of the organization serves to reduce the opportunities for and mechanisms of collusion significantly.
Finally, the fact of persistent overclaiming of SEP status is
also inconsistent with the holdout theory, which is that the
234
See TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson,
943 F.3d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (holding that a “release payment” given as
partial settlement of FRAND licensing dispute was a payment in lieu of damages,
legal rather than equitable in nature, and thus fell within entitlement to a jury
trial).
235
See Norman V. Siebrasse & Thomas F. Cotter, Judicially Determined
FRAND Royalties, in 1 THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW
366 (Jorge L. Contreras, ed. 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=2712837 [https://perma.cc/BYG2-K9GU].
236
See supra text accompanying notes 31–34.
237
E.g., TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. V. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, 943 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (describing the “top down” approach).
238
Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 6, at 1216–26.
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standard setters are operating as a buyers’ cartel in order to
suppress royalties.239 Buy-side cartels, just as sellers’ cartels,
succeed by suppressing output, and the targets naturally respond by trying to avoid the cartel. However, on the buy side
the implementers permit all patents to be declared standard
essential without significant review. On the sell side, customers can be expected to resist a cartel. For example, if apple
growers are fixing prices customers might switch from apples
to pears. If there were a buyers’ cartel targeting SEPs , one
would expect to see inventors attempting to avoid the cartel by
declaring fewer of their patents to be standard essential. That
way they could behave in the same way as patentees generally,
either by licensing or else by suing a suspected infringer for
damages or an injunction through the federal judicial system.
So if the FRAND process is primarily a mechanism for suppressing patent royalties to below market levels, why do patentees persistently declare patents to be standard essential when
in fact they are not? It’s a classic case of the rats swimming
toward rather than away from the sinking ship.
Of course, SSO members are typically required by their
membership agreements to declare patents that are reasonably
thought to write on the standard.240 But that hardly explains
the extensive overclaiming that is in fact occurring. In the
great majority of cases, it appears, it is more lucrative to claim
and be included in the patent pool rather than subject one’s
patents to ordinary judicial testing via infringement suits.
One important difference between a buyers’ cartel and efficient joint purchasing is that the latter is an output-increasing
rather than output-reducing strategy.241 The FRAND process
does not bear the hallmarks of a buyers’ cartel. Rather, it is
more consistent with the theory that generally supports
FRAND in the first place. Namely, at an early stage when the
future of a patent is uncertain and there are alternative technological paths to a standard, it is in a patentee’s interest to have
SEP status. This will produce wide adoption at competitive
prices. Later, however, when development of technology under
the standard has made a particular patent much more valuable, the owner of that patent would naturally prefer to be released from its FRAND obligations or else seek out a way to
avoid it.
239

On the extent of overclaiming, see supra text accompanying note 31–34.
See supra text accompanying notes 17–18.
241
See 12 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2011 (4th
ed. 2019).
240
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Any serious evaluation of holding up versus holding out as
explanatory alternatives can be made only upon considering
the impact of search costs, which in the case of patented information technologies are formidable.242 High search costs explain why most SSOs require participants to make timely
disclosure of IP rights. If they are not voluntarily disclosed the
parties would be unlikely to find them on their own. Patent
“ambush” refers to situations in which SSO participants are
not forthcoming about their patents or patent applications.
They lie in wait until after the SSO has adopted a standard, and
then announce their patent ownership. They will include a
demand for very high royalties, limited by the sunk costs of the
infringers.243 By contrast, the holding out thesis is directed at
known technologies.244 The idea is that manufacturers or other
implementers band together to condition their adoption of a
particular patent or patents on the patent owner’s willingness
to accept a lower royalty or other unfavorable terms.
In any event, patent infringement actions remain available
in the event of infringement. Under the holdout theory, implementers supposedly band together and force a patentee
(through the process of SEP choice) to agree to sub-market
royalties in exchange for selection of its patents. The patentee,
having no alternative, agrees. But a patentee who chooses not
to participate has a damage action for patent infringement
against implementers who use its invention without a license.245 Further, this would likely be an action for willful
infringement, leading to the possibility of multiple damages.246
To be sure, in winner take all patent races losers may go un-

242
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Notice and Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. SEE
ALSO 221, 221–26 (2011).
243
See Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1179–80 (2009). For a discussion of the Rambus
decision, see infra note notes 219–203.
244
E.g., TruePosition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel. Co., 899 F. Supp. 2d 356, 366
(E.D.Pa. 2012) (sustaining complaint that defendant members of SSO agree with
one another to exclude plaintiff’s proffered technology).
245
See Cotter, Hovenkamp & Siebrasse, supra note 25, at 1536–38.
246
On this point, see Contreras, supra note 111, at 895 (describing hold-out
as “simply willful patent infringement”); accord Melamed & Shapiro, supra note
44, at 2120; see also Colleen V. Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out, 21 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (2014) (noting that one source of holdout is
implementer use of patent owned by those who lack the resources to enforce
them). On multiple damages for willful infringement, see Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse
Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1928–31 (2016).
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compensated, but that occurs only if implementers do not infringe their patents.247
Most of the antitrust case law on holdout in standard setting involves disapproval of products or processes where patent
coverage is not relevant.248 Typically, the members decide not
to use the plaintiff’s product at all. For example, an SSO may
refuse to approve a firm’s plastic electrical conduit, hydraulic
valve, or taillight.249 Clearly these cases can rise to the level of
an antitrust violation if the concerted exclusion is found to be
anticompetitive. This occurs mainly when those setting the
standard are in competition with the plaintiff and stand to gain
from exclusion of a superior or lower cost product.250
The theory of holding out may be called upon to explain a
refusal by implementers to pay royalties to a particular patentee, or else to pay too low a royalty. Given the costs of patent
infringement when it is found, a far more likely explanation is
serious doubts about patent infringement or validity.251 Patents in information technology markets—including standardessential patents in networked industries involving electronics
and telecommunications—are rife with these problems. In fact,
patent infringement plaintiffs lose most of their cases, including those involving SEPs. Refusing to accept and pay for a
license on an untested patent is not an abuse of the system.
Rather, it is simply recognition of the fact there is a good
chance that the patent that is being asserted is either invalid or
not infringed.252
247
See Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 547 F.3d 266, 272–73 (5th
Cir. 2008) (rejecting claim of patentee whose technology was not chosen);
HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST, supra note 1, § 35.02D.
248
For a discussion of the many and great variety of cases, see 13 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶¶ 2231–32 (4th ed. 2019).
249
E.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 496
(1988) (SSO’s disapproval of plaintiff’s conduit); Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v.
Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 560–62 (1982) (SSO’s disapproval of the plaintiff’s
valve); see also Moore v. Boating Indus. Ass’ns, 819 F.2d 693, 696–99 (7th Cir.
1987) (SSO’s disapproval of boat trailer taillight), cert denied, 484 U.S. 854 (1987).
250
See 13 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 2232; cf. Moore, 819 F.2d at
712–13 (holding that there was no antitrust liability where SSO of boat trailer
manufacturers were purchasers of taillights, not competitors in production. As a
result, they could not benefit from exclusion of a superior light).
251
See Lemley & Simcoe, supra note 33, at 627–28 (observing that a high
percentage of litigated SEP patents are found not to be infringed). See the discussion of the Lenovo v. Interdigital litigation, supra note 19.
252
See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Our Divided Patent System, 82 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1073, 1099–1100, 1124–26 (2015) (reporting an overall invalidation rate of
42.6% of all patents litigated to judgment); see also Lemley & Simcoe, supra note
33, at 627 (showing that although SEP patents are more likely to be held valid,
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In any event, the holding up versus holding out debate is of
limited significance to the antitrust question, although it could
be relevant in clear cases, such as those involving an implementers’ boycott of a known technology.253 For example, an
SSO may boycott a superior technology because it competes
with technology already used by the implementers in the organization. These were essentially the facts of the Allied Tube
case, and have also been alleged in other cases.254 A concerted
and anticompetitive refusal of a group of implementers to stay
with or adopt an inferior technology, or to use the process to
suppress royalties would be addressable under the antitrust
laws, as it was in Allied Tube. The antitrust violators in that
case would be the implementers rather than the SEP holders.
Importantly, however, Allied Tube did not involve a collective
refusal to license the plaintiff’s patent. Rather, it involved a
collective refusal not to approve the plaintiff’s product at all
and instead to limit the standard to an older technology (steel
conduit). If the defendants had decided to use the plaintiff’s
technology without compensation, they would have been liable
for any patent infringement that occurred.255
3.

Rambus and Nondisclosure

The Rambus decision, which involved patent ambush by
nondisclosure,256 declined to find antitrust liability when the
only proven injury was that implementers had to pay more
money.257 Rambus had failed to disclose some of its patents
and patent applications to an SSO in which it was participating, and then later surprised implementers with them after
they had made significant commitments. The FTC assumed
that the failures violated the SSO’s disclosure requirements,
although it conceded that these requirements were “not a
they are less likely to be found to be infringed, indicating that they were not
standard essential at all).
253
E.g., Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 547 F.3d 266, 272–273
(5th Cir. 2008) (dismissing antitrust complaint by patentee whose technology was
not adopted by 3GPP).
254
See Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 495–97; see also Golden Bridge Tech., 547
F.3d. at 269–70.
255
The decision never discusses patents, and there was no reason for it, given
the defendants’ decision not to approve or use the plaintiff’s product at all. But cf.
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 309–13 (3d Cir. 2007) (discussing Allied Tube in context of disclosure of IP rights in standard setting
process).
256
On SSO disclosure requirements, see discussion supra text accompanying
note 5.
257
Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 467 (D.C. Cir. 2008). For further
discussion, see HOVENKAMP, ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST, supra note 1, § 35.05B.
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model of clarity”258 and did not clearly cover patent applications.259 Further, in one important vote the SSO did not even
ask members to list their intellectual property holdings.260 The
problem was not that Rambus had promised to license specific
technology on specified terms, but rather that it withheld information about its patents, passively inducing implementers of
the resulting standards to assume that the technology that
they were adopting was in the public domain. Later, it surprised them by asserting infringement and demanding
royalties.
The D.C. Circuit declined to find liability because the record did not establish that the implementers would have
adopted a different standard had they known about Rambus’
intellectual property.261 As a result the conduct was deceptive
but it was not shown to be exclusionary under the standards
required by section 2 of the Sherman Act.262 It might have
caused the implementers to pay more for technology that they
had adopted, because now they had to pay Rambus’ royalty as
well. But absent evidence that they would have adopted different technology, which was now impossible, the mere obligation
to pay more did not exclude. As the court observed, “an otherwise lawful monopolist’s use of deception simply to obtain
higher prices normally has no particular tendency to exclude
rivals and thus to diminish competition.”263 Rather, there
must be some “effect on [the market’s] competitive structure.”264 It contrasted Conwood, another section 2 case where
the defendant’s deception had operated to shift market share
away from plaintiff and toward the defendant.265 In that case,
“misrepresentations to retailers about the sales strength of [the
defendant’s] products versus its competitors’ strength” reduced
competition in the monopolized market by increasing the dis-

258

Rambus, 522 F.3d at 461.
Id.
260
Id. at 469.
261
Id. at 463–64.
262
Subsequent to Rambus the FTC itself has moved to exclusive use of sectino
5 of the FTC Act, instead of the Sherman Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2018); Maureen
K. Ohlhausen, The Elusive Role of Competition in the Standard-Setting Antitrust
Debate, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93, 133–36 (2017). One important difference is
that section 5 of the FTC Act does not permit private damages actions.
263
Rambus, 522 F.3d at 464.
264
Id. at 466.
265
Id. (discussing Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir.
2002)).
259
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play space devoted to U.S. Tobacco’s products and decreasing
that allotted to competing products.266
Rambus provides at least a partial rationale for distinguishing between a FRAND violation and an antitrust violation.
More significantly, it distinguishes the types of conduct necessary to violate section 2 of the Sherman Act, in contrast to
section 1. A firm’s unilateral failure to disclose technology can
certainly be a violation of its SSO participation agreement, provided that the commitment is stated with sufficient clarity. The
remedy may be nonenforcement of the patent.267 It will not
violate section 2 of the Sherman Act, however, unless the behavior is also exclusionary in the antitrust sense.268 That is,
section 2 of the Sherman Act is not an appropriate vehicle for
attacking conduct simply because it results in higher prices.
That would be a case of extraction, but not obviously of exclusion. Even under section 2 standards, however, Rambus permits challenges to practices that result in actual suppression of
the sales of competitors or their exclusion from a market. For
example, if Alpha’s failure to disclose led the SSO to adopt
Alpha’s technology rather than Beta’s alternative technology,
then the failure to disclose could also be unreasonably
exclusionary.269
Section 1 of the Sherman Act is another matter. The standard for illegality under section 1, which applies only to multilateral conduct, is that it “restrains trade,” which means that
the conduct tends to produce lower output and higher
prices.270 Traditional ties and exclusive dealing are agreements in restraint of trade, although they are sometimes also

266

Id. at 464.
See, e.g., Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004, 1008–10
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (refusing to enforce patent that was not properly disclosed).
Subsequent to Rambus many SSOs strengthened and clarified their disclosure
requirements. See HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST, supra note 1, § 35.05;
Nicos L. Tsilas, Toward Greater Clarity and Consistency in Patent Disclosure Policies in a Post-Rambus World, 17 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 475, 494–97 (2004).
268
See Townshend v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 2000 WL 433505, at *19 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 28, 2000) (holding that a simple nondisclosure does not violate antitrust
laws).
269
See, e.g., WI-LAN, Inc. v. LG Elec., Inc., 382 F.Supp.3d 1012, 1019–24
(S.D. Cal. 2019) (distinguishing Rambus when plaintiff alleged that an alternative
standard existed that would have been adopted but for the defendant’s deception);
Actividentity Corp. v. Intercede Grp. PLC, 2009 WL 8674284, at *3–5 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 11, 2009) (distinguishing Rambus and finding a basis for antitrust violation
when the failure to disclose did lead to market exclusion).
270
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
267
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treated as acts of monopolization when the structural requirements are met.271
The ultimate concern of antitrust law is with conduct that
reduces output and increases price. Section 2 of the Sherman
Act takes a conservative approach to unilateral conduct because of its concern to avoid regulating unilaterally set prices
in the guise of antitrust enforcement. Collaborative practices
are generally not entitled to the same deference. For example,
price-fixing is unlawful even if the agreement does not exclude
anyone. Even under section 1, however, the tendency in tying
and exclusive dealing cases is to look for evidence that the
higher prices were accompanied by effects that either foreclosed a significant rival or else raised its costs.272
4.

Entitlement to an Injunction

Aside from FRAND, patentees may have a statutory right to
obtain an injunction against proven infringers. Section 283 of
the Patent Act creates a right to an injunction against patent
infringement “in accordance with the principles of equity.”273
However, The FRAND commitment requires the patent owner
to license its patent, typically to all qualified producers employing the standard in question. This does not necessarily mean
that the owner of such a patent can never obtain an injunction.
For example, if a FRAND royalty has been independently determined and a recalcitrant infringer refuses to pay, an injunction
may be in order. That is largely consistent with the government
agencies’ 2019 Policy Statement on injunctions on FRAND
patents.274
One important omission in the Government’s Policy Statement is its failure to address the important question of when a
patentee’s conduct might affect its entitlement to an injunction. That question is also governed by equitable principles.
The right to an injunction includes the age-old requirement
271
On the use of section 2 to reach tying and exclusive dealing by monopolist,
see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE § 7.6 (6th ed. 2020).
272
See, generally 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 45, ¶ 1729 (tying under
rule of reason). However, under United States antitrust law tying can still be
condemned under an idiosyncratic per se rule that does not require proof of
foreclosure. See id. ¶ 1720; and Erik Hovenkamp & Timothy Simcoe, Tying and
Exclusion in FRAND Licensing: Evaluating Qualcomm, ANTITRUST SOURCE (2020)
(forthcoming) On exclusive dealing, see generally 11 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra
note 81, ¶ 1821 (noting relevance of foreclosure of competitors).
273
35 U.S.C. § 283 (2018); see also eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547
U.S. 388, 392 (2006).
274
See Policy Statement, supra note 2.
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that “he who seeks equity must do equity.”275 As the Supreme
Court has put it, “such rights shall not be enforced in favor of
one who affirmatively seeks their enforcement except upon
condition that he consent to accord to the other his correlative
equitable rights.”276
In the FRAND context, the patentee’s conduct becomes relevant when the patentee has “unclean hands” because it is not
adhering to the FRAND obligations or is committing other violations itself. For example, to the extent a firm is reneging on its
FRAND obligation by refusing to license, insisting on a product
tie, a loyalty provision, or some other condition that is in violation of its FRAND obligation,277 it loses its right to obtain an
injunction, at least on those particular patents. That limitation
ordinarily exists until such time as the plaintiff seeking an
injunction has “purged” its own violation. For example, in its
decision in Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., the Supreme Court held that a patentee
could not obtain an injunction in an infringement action if its
own conduct was tainted “relative to the matter in which he
seeks relief, however improper may have been the behavior of
the defendant.”278
The FRAND commitment, which does not state a specific
royalty, is subject to a good faith negotiation requirement with
respect to the royalty’s size. Reasonable minds can differ about
how royalties are to be calculated, and some disputes have had
to be resolved by neutral tribunals, including courts. By contrast, the requirement that FRAND-encumbered patents be licensed to all qualified implementers of the standard without
further condition is not something that is subject to further
bargaining. If a firm has made a FRAND commitment and then
refuses to license to competitors in a hardware market, or if it
licenses only to those who also agree to purchase its chips or
other hardware, or insists on exclusive agreements or loyalty
(market share) commitments, then its unclean hands deny it a
right to an injunction.279
275
E.g., Manufacturers’ Finance Co. v. McKey, 294 U.S. 442, 449 (1935);
Crosby v. Buchanan, 90 U.S. 420, 447–51 (1874).
276
Id.
277
See supra text accompanying note 22.
278
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co. 324
U.S. 806, 814 (1945).
279
See, e.g., HTC Corp. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, 2019 WL
4734950, at *10 (E.D. Tex. May 22, 2019) (holding that firm that breached its
FRAND obligations by refusing to offer fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory
terms had unclean hands, and thus could not enforce its FRAND-encumbered
patents against an implementer);see also Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc.,
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Denying an injunction in such situations is essential to
making the FRAND system work. Otherwise every dispute
could either end up delaying product development or production, or else it could force developers for whom time was critical
to pay excessive royalties. A firm that plans to practice a
FRAND-encumbered patent in a way that is contemplated by
the FRAND agreement should be entitled to proceed subject
only to an ex post damages rule.280 The patentee should then
be entitled to FRAND damages. These rules exist quite aside
from any question of antitrust liability. They are entirely a
function of the relationship between the FRAND commitment
and entitlement to an injunction.
Historically the doctrine of unclean hands, which gave rise
to the much more expansive theory of patent “misuse,” applied
only when the patentee’s misconduct related to the same patent, party, or conduct as the infringement suit. As the Supreme Court put it in 1933, courts
apply the maxim requiring clean hands only where some unconscionable act of one coming for relief has immediate and
necessary relation to the equity that he seeks in respect of
the matter in litigation. They do not close their doors because
of plaintiff’s misconduct, whatever its character, that has no
relation to anything involved in the suit.281

Subsequently, the Supreme Court considerably broadened
the doctrine. In Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.,282 the
patentee of a salt-injecting machine was tying salt to its machine, which constituted misuse and was very likely a violation
of the antitrust laws as then interpreted as well.283 The Su166 F.3d 772, 794 (5th Cir. 1999) (“It is old hat that a court called upon to do
equity should always consider whether the petitioning party has acted . . . with
unclean hands.” (quoting Texaco Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs,
60 F.3d 867, 880 (1st Cir. 1995)); Evolved Wireless, LLC v. Apple, Inc., 2019 WL
831112 (D. Del. Feb. 21, 2019) (denying summary on claim that patentee’s patents were unenforceable in equity because it was in violation of its FRAND obligations); Saint Lawrence Comm’cn., LLC v. Motorola Mobility, LLC, 2018 WL
915125, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2018).
280
Cf., e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F.Supp. 758, 760 (D.
Del. 1981) (noting that the BMI copyright blanket license provision given to broadcasters, which offers “immediate, indemnified” access to “any and all songs” subject to the agreement).
281
Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator, 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933). The
Court then found the connection between the infringement suit and the patentee’s
conduct to be sufficiently close to warrant application of unclean hands. Id. at
247.
282
314 U.S. 488 (1942).
283
See Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, (1947) (upholding finding
of an antitrust violation on the same facts).
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preme Court held that the tying amounted to patent misuse,
which rendered the patent unenforceable against a rival producer of infringing salt machines who was in no way injured by
the tie.284
Today, most courts have returned to the more restrictive
position, rejecting the unclean hands doctrine if the claim of
patentee misconduct rested on actions that were unrelated to
the patents or parties in the underlying infringement action.285
Nevertheless, the unclean hands doctrine continues to serve an
important role when the patentee has committed misconduct
with respect to the same patents or parties as those involved in
the lawsuit. For example, in Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom
Corp.,286 the court denied a patentee relief when it improperly
failed to disclose patents deemed to be standard essential in
violation of the SSO’s disclosure requirements, and then later
attempted to assert them against an implementing manufacturer. The court held that equitable estoppel prevented the
patentee from subsequently asserting the patents when its own
prior acts and statements denied that they were essential.287 It
likened the situation to post-issuance patent misuse.288
Under this narrower view of unclean hands, an injunction
would be denied to someone who was in violation of a FRAND
commitment on the same patent or with respect to the same
infringer that it was seeking to enforce. The same thing would
apply if it were committing an antitrust violation with respect to
those particular patents or infringement defendants.289 In its
284

See 10 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 70, ¶ 1781c.
E.g., Saint Lawrence Commc’n, LLC v. Motorola Mobility, LLC, 2018 WL
915125, at *9–10 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2018) (seeking injunction on a FRANDencumbered patent in Germany was not misuse; nor was tying in the absence of a
showing of market power).
286
548 F.3d 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
287
See id. at 1022–23.
288
See id. at 1025. The court added:
In addition to the analogy to inequitable conduct, we find the remedy of unenforceability based on post-issuance patent misuse instructive in this case. As Qualcomm notes, the successful assertion
of patent misuse may render a patent unenforceable until the misconduct can be purged; it does not render the patent unenforceable
for all time.
Id.
289
Another limitation on the “unclean hands” doctrine is that, because it is a
creature of equity, it limits the right to an injunction but not the right to damages.
See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 903, 916 (N.D.
Ill. 2013) (“The parties have not cited, however, and the court has not found, any
cases suggesting that the existence of a [F]RAND commitment provides a complete
defense against an infringement lawsuit. Instead, most cases merely limit a patent
holder’s remedy to collecting a [F]RAND royalty. . . .”) (alteration in original).
285
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Qualcomm decision the Ninth Circuit decided that there was no
antitrust violation did not consider the question whether
Qualcomm was in violation of its FRAND commitments.290
By contrast, a patentee who has honored all of its FRAND
commitments and is willing to give an unrestricted license to
any implementer of the standard should be permitted to obtain
an injunction against a firm that refuses to honor a FRAND
commitment, in particular by refusing to pay a reasonable royalty after that royalty has been determined.291
Aside from refusal to issue an injunction, should the owner
of FRAND encumbered patents be accountable under the antitrust laws for other alleged abuses of the litigation processes?
As a general proposition, seeking injunctive relief from a
court—something that the Patent Act expressly contemplates292—is not an antitrust violation. Nevertheless, there are
important limitations. If someone files a suit that no reasonable litigant would have brought with the expectation of success,
then antitrust liability can attach. In such cases, the litigation
plaintiff’s expectation of success comes not from winning the
lawsuit, but rather from depleting the defendant’s assets, delaying its market entry, or otherwise injuring it in ways unrelated to the outcome of the litigation.
The grandparent of these cases is Walker Process Equip.,
Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp.293 The patentee had a patent
that it knew to be unenforceable under the statutory on sale
bar,294 but it attempted to exclude a competitor from the market anyway via a patent infringement suit. The Walker Process
case applied the so-called “sham” litigation exception that
holds that the filing of a lawsuit loses its First Amendment
protected status if the lawsuit is a “sham,” which means that it
was filed without a realistic prospect of success from the litiga-

290

Qualcomm, Inc. v. FTC, 969 F.3d 974, 2020 WL 4591476 (9th Cir. Aug. 11,

2020).
291
See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1331–1332 (Fed. Cir.
2014), overruled on other grounds, Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d
1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (stating that irreparable harm, and thus entitlement to an
injunction, may be established “where an infringer unilaterally refuses a FRAND
royalty or unreasonably delays negotiations to the same effect”);see also Huawei
Techs., Co. v. Samsung Elecs., Co., 2018 WL 1784065, at *1–4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13,
2018) (same) (quoting Apple Inc., 757 F.3d at 1332)).
292
35 U.S.C. § 283 (2018).
293
382 U.S. 172 (1965).
294
The on sale bar makes a patent unenforceable if it was in public use of on
sale more than one year prior to the filing date. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) & (b).
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tion itself, but rather to intimidate, harass, or deplete the resources of the litigation defendant.295
One important precondition to Walker Process liability is
that existing law be sufficiently “settled” that a lawsuit filed in
conflict with it should be regarded as “objectively meritless.”296
That is, a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position should
have known that the lawsuit would not succeed. For example,
if there is a conflict in the Federal Courts of Appeal respecting a
particular issue, a plaintiff should be entitled to convince the
court to apply one interpretation rather than the other one.297
Issues of first impression or those that could reasonably come
out either way can of course be the subject of litigation.
There is no obvious reason that the sham litigation rule
should not apply in the FRAND context, but under these same
constraints. Once it has become a matter of settled law that a
SEP owner is not entitled to an injunction under a given set of
circumstances—that is, that a knowledgeable person would
realize that there was no genuine prospect of relief—then further lawsuits seeking an injunction under those circumstances
may give rise to antitrust liability.298 If the lawsuit is plainly in
violation of an enforceable contract obligation, Walker Process
liability should be appropriate. On the other hand, if the issue
remains open to legal doubt, then filing a lawsuit is appropriate, even if the suit is ultimately unsuccessful.
One important consideration is that sham litigation establishes only the conduct element of an antitrust offense. In
order to establish an antitrust violation, the challenger must
still make out the other elements of an antitrust cause of action—namely, power and unreasonable exclusion for section 2
cases, or a restraint of trade for section 1 cases.299
295
On antitrust liability for “sham” litigation, see generally 1 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 70, ¶¶ 201–08.
296
See, e.g., Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures, Indus., Inc.
508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993).
297
See id. at 65 (noting a circuit split on the question of whether charging
money to show a movie in a hotel room was a “performance,” and thus copyright
infringement and stating that as a result, “Any reasonable copyright owner in
Columbia’s position could have believed that it had some chance of winning an
infringement suit . . . .”).
298
See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1048 (9th Cir. 2015)
(approving jury conclusion that for a firm to seek injunctive relief on a FRANDencumbered patent under the circumstances of that case did not enjoy antitrust
immunity); Apple Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 2012 WL 2276664, at *12 (N.D. Ill. June
22, 2012) (similarly approving the jury conclusion).
299
See 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 706a3 (4th
ed. 2013).
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For example, once the FRAND obligation for a patent or set
of patents has been established to require licensing to all implementers operating on the standard, a firm that files infringement lawsuits seeking injunctions against firms simply
because they are product market competitors should generate
the conduct basis for antitrust liability. Although market damages for exclusion or delay could be significant, the case law
also permits damages to be based on improperly incurred legal
costs.300 While this road to antitrust liability might seem narrow, it becomes broader as litigation clarifies issues so that
they can be regarded as settled.
CONCLUSION
Oversight of FRAND obligations is one area where it is critical for the courts to keep an eye on longer run concerns for
innovation. FRAND has evolved into a highly successful but
nevertheless vulnerable mechanism for facilitating joint innovation and product development. Indeed, for networked technologies such as cellular phones it is difficult to see how
coordinated development by numerous competitive firms could
be achieved without the significant coordination and technology sharing that FRAND enables. That system will be undermined, however, if one firm is able to renege on its voluntarily
entered obligations, because others will then do the same. The
regime of collaborative innovation that FRAND contemplates
would very likely fall apart, and at great harm to competition
and economic welfare. The Ninth Circuit’s 2020 Qualcomm decision indicates that this fear is more than fanciful. Unless
corrected, Congress may have to intervene in order to protect a
system that has been an important driver of innovation and
economic growth.
Among the various legal tools for policing the FRAND process antitrust is only one, but it is an important one and has its
own unique requirements and tools for analysis. As a result,
the existence of FRAND obligations is hardly irrelevant to antitrust claims. Antitrust law takes markets as it finds them. For
example, in the numerous antitrust decisions involving the
300
See, e.g., TransWeb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Props. Co., 812 F.3d 1295,
1309–12 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (permitting award of litigation costs for improper patent
infringement lawsuit); Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n,
Inc., 814 F.2d 358, 373–74 (7th Cir. 1987) (similar); Assessment Techs. of Wis.,
LLC, v. WireData, Inc., 361 F.3d 434, 438–39 (7th Cir. 2004) (same in the context
of an improper copyright infringement lawsuit).
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NCAA,301 a very large joint venture, the antitrust courts do not
pretend that the joint venture does not exist. Rather, they
assume that the venture itself performs a socially valuable
function. Then they begin with its rules and the investments
and commitments that its structure creates and considers how
antitrust can be used to make the market function competitively on those assumptions.
FRAND is no different. While it has its flaws, the standard
setting process and the use of standard essential patents is
well settled and has produced significant benefits within a
competitive environment. In that case the best use of antitrust
law is to police the competitive process within that system.

301
See Richard E. Kaye, Annotation, Application of Federal Antitrust Laws to
Collegiate Sports, 87 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 43 (2014) (showing a comprehensive list of
antitrust cases against the NCAA that is updated weekly).
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